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Abstract 
 
 The "Great Grain Robbery" was a term applied to describe the 1972 Soviet-American 
grain sales when the Soviets bought large quantities of U.S. grain at low prices. Due to their high 
demand being hidden by the requirements for secrecy in the sale, market prices did not increase 
to match the increased Soviet demand. As a result many American farmers concluded they 
missed out on the true value of their grain.  Canadian farmers, however, sold their grain through 
the single-desk Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) which used pooling. They consequently 
benefitted from the Soviet purchases and did well from the increased Soviet demand.  
 
 The "Great Grain Robbery" term was resurrected in the 1990s during the highly polarized 
debate over the value and continued relevance of the single-desk Canadian Wheat Board.  It was 
also repurposed so that it no longer meant the 1972 Soviet-American grain sales.  Instead, the 
"Great Grain Robbery" became a code-term that encompassed all the perceived problems with 
the Canadian Wheat Board.  It became the main focus of the western Canadian agricultural 
community in the debate over agricultural policies, in particular "marketing freedom" by those 
opposed to the CWB. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
  In 1972 the Soviet Union experienced a severe crop failure due to frost and poor 
germination rates.  The Soviets had dealt with a similar crop failure in 1965.  This crop failure 
had forced them to butcher the majority of their animal herds that they been building up since the 
1950s. By 1972 their herds were only beginning to return to the pre-scarcity levels and the 
Soviets were determined not to repeat the events again because of a grain shortage.  Through 
negotiations and shrewd bargaining, Exportkhleb, the Soviet grain trading agency, managed to 
secure the greater part of the United State's 1972-73 crop.  These grain purchases led to what 
American Senator Henry Jackson would call “one of the most notorious Government foulups in 
American history.”1 The 1972 sales were characterized as one of the biggest swindles in recent 
western agricultural history and became known as the "Great Grain Robbery" or the "Great 
Russian Grain Robbery." 
 During the 1990s the western Canadian agricultural community became strongly 
polarized between the pro-Board side, people who supported the Canadian Wheat Board's 
(CWB) single-desk sales mandate, and the anti-Board side, people who opposed it and wished to 
gain so-called marketing freedom by removing the CWB's single-desk.  It was during this period 
of polarization that the "Great Grain Robbery" resurfaced in the western Canadian agricultural 
community. The anti-Board side used the 1972 sales as an example of where Canadian farmers 
had done poorly because of the CWB's single-desk.    This assessment, however, contradicted the 
actual Canadian experience in 1972 when Canadian farmers had done quite well.  The "Great 
                                                 
1
 U. S. Senate  Committee on Government Operations, Sales of Grain to the Soviet Union: Hearings before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974, 1. 
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Grain Robbery" became a catch-phrase which came to mean everything that was wrong with 
Canadian agricultural policy in general and the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) in particular.  The 
1972 sales became an example within the fuller meaning of the catch-phrase. Don Baron's book, 
Canada's Great Grain Robbery, helped to codify the meaning of the "Great Grain Robbery" 
catch-phrase for the western farm community. It provided the 1972 sales as an example of why 
the Canadian Wheat Board's single-desk was not beneficial to farmers even though this 
interpretation of the Canadian experience of the sales was not historically accurate. This 
inaccurate version of western Canadian grain history provided legitimacy to the anti-Board side's 
claims, which they had previously lacked, compared to the pro-Board side which had a long 
tradition of providing historical examples to support their arguments.   Baron's book represented 
the history it provided as being a secret and, until the book's publication, known only to a select 
few individuals which helped support the anti-Board side's belief in both the book's legitimacy 
and their characterization of themselves as being freedom fighters with a privileged 
understanding.  The inaccurate presentation of the Canadian experience was used by the anti-
Board side as a historical precedent to help provide legitimacy to their claims that western 
Canadian farmers would be in a better position once they were free from the CWB. 
 In 1972 if the open market had performed as it was supposed to do, the Soviets’ 
immediate need for large quantities of grain ought to have set off a massive increase in grain 
prices when their buyers first arrived in North America and began contacting sellers in Canada 
and the United States. The international grain market, however, was not the transparent ideal of 
pure economic models.  Instead, the international grain market was, and still is, essentially an 
oligopoly of less than seven private companies
2
 which kept their commercially valuable 
                                                 
2
 The biggest are Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Bunge sometimes known as Bunge y Born, Cargill, Louis 
Dreyfus, Glencore, André, and Continental. 
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information carefully guarded.  Although this market was competitive, it was hardly open in 
either the sense of allowing new entrants into it, or in terms of information sharing. It essentially 
functioned as a private market place administered by a few firms focused on margin trading. The 
Soviet grain buyers used this privacy to their advantage. The Soviets made an agreement with the 
United States Government to have the option to buy grain from its stockpiles.  They 
simultaneously negotiated sales with the private trade at the same time they were bargaining with 
the American government.  As a part of this government-to-government transaction, the Soviets  
insisted these purchases be kept secret and used this secrecy when they contracted to purchase 
grain from American-based grain companies, Continental, Cook Industries, Louis Dreyfus, 
Cargill, and Garnac, who all had a vested interest in keeping their own sales to the Soviets secret 
from their competitors as well.  This lack of transparency prevented the price increase that 
should have occurred in response to the increased Soviet demand.  When the Soviet purchases 
finally became public knowledge, there was an outcry over how cheaply the Soviets had bought 
the grain as well as the amount of money which had been made by the American grain traders 
through their manipulation of American government export subsidies.   
 In Canada, western farmers’ grain was marketed through the central selling agency of the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), an arms-length crown corporation, until the implementation of 
Bill C-18 on August 1, 2012 which removed the CWB's single-desk authority.
3
  The Wheat 
                                                 
3
 Bill C-18, titled "The Marketing Freedom For Grain Farmers Act", made other changes to the Canadian Wheat 
Board Act such as removing the CWB's role in transportation logistics, and dismissing the farmer-elected directors 
who were replaced with government appointees, but the largest change was the removal of the CWB's single-desk 
marketing responsibilities.  C-18 also made provisions to transition the revised CWB from a voluntary organization 
run by directors appointed by the Minister of Agriculture to a private corporation. At the time of this writing there 
are still several court cases extant on this piece of legislation. C-18 was introduced without holding a farmer vote on 
the changes to the Canadian Wheat Board Act even though section 47.1 of the Act required a farmer vote if any 
changes were to be made.  The Canadian Wheat Board, its elected pro-single desk directors, and the Friends of the 
Canadian Wheat Board, a group of farmers who supported the single-desk, challenged the validity of C-18 based in 
part on the requirement for a farmer vote based on section 47.1. On 7 December 2011 federal Justice Campbell ruled 
that the federal Agriculture Minister had "failed to comply with his statutory duty pursuant to section 47." Justice 
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Board competed with the private grain trade in the international market. Its core function was as 
the collective bargaining agent and sales desk for western Canadian grain farmers.  When the 
Soviet buyers wanted to purchase Canadian grain they had to deal with the CWB.  The CWB’s 
intelligence division had alerted it to the Soviet’s disastrous crop failures so that their negotiators 
were generally able to sell for higher than the then prevailing world price.  Canadian capacity to 
handle and transport grain to port is limited.  At the time the CWB was responsible for allocating 
the resources necessary to move grain to port.  This power, along with the physical limits of the 
Canadian grain transportation and handling system, had the useful effect of allowing the CWB, 
without tipping off its competitors in the international trade, to stretch Canadian grain sales out 
so that the CWB sales were made as the international world price was rising as the international 
                                                                                                                                                             
Campbell found "that the Minister's conduct is an affront to the rule of law." At the time of the ruling the C-18 was 
still before the Senate Standing Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.  It was given royal assent on 15 December 
2011.  Subsequently, The Friends of the Canadian Wheat Board launched a constitutional challenge and class action 
lawsuit against the Government of Canada. The constitutional challenge argues C-18 is invalid and any actions 
caused by it must be reversed. The class action seeks $17 billion in damages from the loss of the single-desk and 
other assets including the loss of hard assets owned by the CWB, including its office building and railcars, since 
farmers paid for the assets. There are also on-going appeals of the Campbell decision. 
The Canadian Wheat Board et al. V. Attorney General of Canada, Order T-1735-11, 2011. ; The Canadian Wheat 
Board et al. V. Attorney General of Canada, 2011. 
 
When the Conservative government initially announced its intention to introduce legislation removing the CWB's 
single-desk authority there was a strong demand and expectation from farmers that the government would  hold a 
vote on the issue as required by section 47.1   Agriculture Minister Gerry "Ritz said the Tory majority victory in the 
last election was indication enough that the government is within its rights to change the legislation so a farmer vote 
will not be required."  As a result of the government's unwillingness to hold a vote, the Canadian Wheat Board held 
a mail-in plebiscite to determine what farmers wanted.  The mail-in plebiscite was conducted by the accounting firm 
of Meyers Norris Penny (MNP) in the same way that the CWB directors’ elections had been conducted since 1998.  
The plebiscite question asked farmers to chose between two answers. The ballot sent to eligible wheat producers had 
the choice of: "A) I wish to maintain the ability to market all wheat, with the continuing exception of feed wheat 
sold domestically, through the CWB single-desk system [or] B) I wish to remove the single-desk marketing system 
from the CWB and sell all wheat through an open market system."  While the ballot sent to eligible barley producers 
gave a choice between: "A) I wish to maintain the ability to market all barley, both malting/food, with the 
continuing exception of feed barley sold domestically, through the CWB single-desk system. [or] B) I wish to 
remove the single-desk marketing system from the CWB and sell all barley through an open-market system."  The 
participation rate was 56% or 38,261 ballots which was considered to be very high for a mail-in ballot.  The results 
of the plebiscite were that 62% of voters supported keeping the single-desk for wheat and 51% for barley.  
Canadian Wheat Board. "Farmers vote to keep Canadian Wheat Board." Winnipeg, 12 September, 2011. 
Martin Cash, "Ritz takes swipe at CWB; says plebiscite irrelevant," Winnipeg Free Press, 30 June 2011. 
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grain trade itself become increasingly aware of the Soviets’ massive purchase plan.4  Since the 
sales were staggered throughout the year Canadian farmers benefited from the Soviet purchases 
and the increased prices once the increased Soviet demand became public knowledge. 
 Even though the 1972 Soviet purchases were financially significant with far reaching 
economic and political consequences, they are a relatively overlooked part of agricultural 
history. Any work on them focuses almost exclusively on the American experience of the sales.  
Amber Waves of Grain by James Trager, which came out only a year later in 1973, was the first, 
and so far, the only book entirely focused on these Soviet-American grain sales. Its subtitle, The 
Secret Russian Wheat Sales That Sent American Food Prices Soaring, captured the book's 
central theme. The 1975 reprint was re-titled to the simpler and more exciting sounding Great 
Grain Robbery, although changes to the text were minimal.  The book focused on the Soviet 
purchases causing rising food prices in America.  Since it was published so quickly after the 
Soviet purchases became public the book does not substantially address the U.S. House of 
Representatives subcommittee which had only begun hearings on the sales in September of 1972 
or the U.S. Senate subcommittee hearings that began in the summer of 1973.   
 From the beginning of the book Trager sets up the Americans as ill-informed dupes of the 
crafty Soviets who “bought it all [the grain] stealthily, digging deep into Soviet gold reserves to 
do it.”5  The book also argues that a large part of the outrage created by the sales was due to the 
fact that the Soviets had kept the sales secret.
6
  Later work echoes Trager’s assessment that the 
secrecy intrinsic to the private market system was what allowed the Soviets to be so successful.
7
 
The book does mention that the Soviets purchased grain from Canada; no judgement, however, is 
                                                 
4
 Interview with former CWB staff member, 28 October, 2009 (anonymous source 3).; Interview with former CWB 
staff member, 13 April, 2010 (anonymous source 1). 
5
 James Trager, Amber Waves of Grain, (New York: Arthur Fields Books Inc., 1973), 7. 
6
Ibid., 8. 
7
 Ibid., 181. 
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given whether the Canadian farmers ultimately did better than the American farmers, although 
there is the implication that Canadian farmers did better.  Trager does make it clear that it was 
the American system which allowed Soviet traders "to fragment purchases."
8
  The book also 
repeated the accusation made by Republican Senator Hugh Scott that it was "people associated 
with the Canadian Wheat Board"
9
 who were driving the calls for inquiries into the Soviet-
American sales and the American grain trade in general.  Even though Trager points out that 
both the CWB and the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) had been in contact with the USDA, he 
presents the accusations made by Scott, as well as similar points made by other individuals, as 
valid concerns even though no evidence is given which would support their veracity.
10
  Scott and 
others who shared his view disliked the CWB because they saw it as government involvement in 
private business which was counter to their free-market ideology. Even worse to them was that 
this type of government involvement seemed to mirror the Communist ideals of state control.  
Secondly, Republicans like Scott saw the calls for inquiry into the 1972 sales as baseless attacks 
on the Nixon administration. Blaming people associated with the CWB for these attacks was a 
way to deflect the point that it was American citizens and elected officials who were asking for 
inquiries.  It also reinforced the propaganda that the Canadians and their grain marketing Board 
were threatened by the American free-market grain trade and the Nixon administration's support 
of free-markets. 
 While the 1972 Russian purchases get passing mention in several histories of the Nixon 
administration, there has never been a detailed examination or analysis of the sales.  Even U.S. 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, one of the principle players in the sales, only briefly touches 
on the subject in his autobiography White House Years.  He barely acknowledges that there were 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 
9
 Ibid., 
10
 Ibid., 181-182. 
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any issues surrounding the sales.  While he alludes to the idea that the set-up for the sales was 
reached during the SALT summit, especially in relation to the removal of export shipping 
restrictions, he does not supply any significant detail.
11
  Secondly, the image of the cunning 
Soviet traders is heavily featured in this section.  Kissinger makes the Americans look 
surprisingly naïve when he writes: "no senior official — except possibly Secretary of Agriculture 
Butz— understood what they [the Soviets] were doing."12 This characterization, aside from 
being an implicit criticism of a cabinet colleague for secrecy, a not inconsiderable charge coming 
from Kissinger, is in direct contrast to the rest of the book which portrays the Americans as not 
only competent but also well informed.  Moreover, while Kissinger locates the Soviet grain 
purchases within the section on the results of the Moscow summit, he actually provides little 
context for how the purchases were connected to the summit. For example, difficulties in 
removing the legislation requiring shipping on American crewed ships are hardly touched on 
even though the removal of this legislation would leave maritime union leaders so angry that 
they would refuse to deal with Kissinger.
13
 The details of how the shipping legislation was 
removed are handled with the note that "those issues were resolved soon after the summit."
14
 The 
removal of this legislation was critical in creating the conditions for the Soviet grain purchases 
because it removed one of the extra transportation costs associated with buying grain from the 
Americans.  Kissinger also notes that "the Soviet purchase of grain in our markets was seen as a 
domestic matter, an element of our agricultural policy"
15
 to explain the Nixon Administration's 
                                                 
11
 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company Ltd., 1979), 1269. 
12
 Kissinger, 1270. 
13
 Seymour M. Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 
345-346; Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1991), 
480-481. 
14
 Kissinger, 1269. 
15
 Ibid., 
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lack of information about the Soviet purchasing plans. Afterwards "all such transactions were 
treated as foreign policy matters."
16
 
 In The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain Agreement, Roger Porter uses the 1975 negotiation of a five-
year grain deal between the United States and the Soviet Union to show how international 
agreements are conducted. The previous relationship between the two countries in terms of grain 
sales is explained within the first chapter to provide the context in which the 1975 deals were 
made. It is in this section that Porter focuses on the 1972 sales.  He gives a more detailed 
explanation of the Soviet crop failures and how the Americans failed to heed their own 
intelligence about Soviet crops.  Unlike many other accounts of the 1972 sales, Porter provides 
not just a summary of the American position leading up to the 1972 sales but also a detailed 
summary of the Soviets' agricultural history beginning with Stalin's agricultural programs.  By 
giving detail about the Soviets' situation Porter shows how the 1972 sales were not extraordinary 
and that it was only the failures of the American system that allowed the Soviets to position 
themselves to procure American government financing and low-priced grain from the private 
companies. Porter was a member of the Ford administration which followed the Nixon 
administration and this role does seem to colour his view of how the 1975 five-year grain deal 
was handled as he takes pains to point out how all the problems associated with the 1972 sales 
were removed before the negotiations for the five-year grain deal began.  
 The two most extensive examinations of the 1972 sales can be found in Wayne G. 
Broehl’s book Cargill: Going Global, the second in his three-volume history of the company, 
and Dan Morgan’s Merchants of Grain.  Both authors provide detailed accounts of the sales, 
especially the back-and-forth of negotiations between the Soviet traders and the individual 
companies.  Broehl's account is more sympathetic towards Cargill which is not unexpected since 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 1270. 
 9 
 
 
the book was indirectly financed by Cargill, and he spent considerable time with members of the 
family and company.
17
 However, Cargill: Going Global is still well researched and provides 
more explanation of the reasoning behind Cargill's actions because of Broehl's access to the 
private Cargill archives. By contrast, Merchants of Grain, which Broehl references, uses the 
1972 sales as a starting point to show why the reader ought to be interested in the international 
grain trade.  Since the 1972 American-Soviet sales were unusual at the time, creating 
circumstances which affected the international grain market for years afterwards, and provided 
an example of the problems of an open market, both books take pains to show in a step-by-step 
fashion how the sales happened.  The aftermath of the sales, however, is portrayed as only an 
American issue.  The American subcommittee investigations into the sales are the most 
noteworthy consequence for both Morgan and Broehl.  The broader implications for the 
international grain market and other grain exporting countries are mentioned only in relation to 
how America was affected. 
 Even though the consequences of the Soviet deals touched all grain importing and 
exporting nations, the works written about the sales are primarily focused on the American 
experience. One is lucky to see a few sentences about Canada or any other grain exporting 
country.  William Morriss’s history of the Canadian Wheat Board, Chosen Instrument II, devotes 
ten pages to the issue focusing on CWB sales to the Soviets during 1972 and the events in the 
United States.  While Morriss describes the immediate positive impact of the sales on the CWB, 
there is no mention of how the Canadian agricultural community reacted to the news of the sales. 
Nor does Morriss reference the sales or go into detail on the agricultural community’s reactions 
on this or most other issues of significance to farmers.  Within the literature on Canadian 
                                                 
17
 For a detailed description of the financing and time with the Cargill family and employees see Wayne G. Broehl, 
Cargill: Going Global (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1998), ix-xi. 
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agriculture, Morriss’s writing is by far the lengthiest treatment of the Soviet sales.  While other 
agricultural history writers, such as Garry Fairbairn and Carrol Jaques, make note of groups like 
the Alberta Grain Commission (AGC) and Palliser Wheat Growers Association (PWGA) which 
championed open market ideology, their books provide no analysis about the genesis of these 
groups in the 1970s.  Agricultural economists are largely silent on the topic of the 1972 sales in 
Canadian agricultural history.  While the Canadian experience of the 1972 American-Soviet 
sales is not well documented, the same is not true for western Canadian agricultural history in 
general. For example, Gregory Marchildon's edited compilation of essays, Agricultural History, 
features works from many historians including Lewis Thomas, Warren Elofson, Max Foran, D.J. 
Hall, and Patrick Brennan who have written about western Canadian history. Vernon Fowke, 
George Britnell, and D. A. MacGibbon were some of the early historians within the field. Their 
work has been followed by historians like Gerald Friesen, John Herd Thompson, Murray 
Knuttila, and Paul Earl who have focused on various aspects of western Canadian history in 
relation to agriculture. Thompson and Fowke have both done work which focuses on the 
Canadian Wheat Board and its role within western Canadian agriculture.  Most recently 
Thompson has focused on the CWB in relation to farmers' movements and Canadian-American 
trade relations in numerous articles including "An Orderly Reconstruction: Prairie Agriculture in 
World War II"
18
 with G. R. I. MacPherson. Agricultural economists have also written 
extensively about the Canadian Wheat Board. Economists like Murray Fulton, Andrew Schmitz, 
Hartley Furtan, and Edward Tyrchniewicz who have written about the CWB tend to focus, not 
on its historical or social context, but on how it functions for farmers and within the international 
grain market.  
                                                 
18
 G. R. I. MacPherson, and John Herd Thompson, "An Orderly Reconstruction: Prairie Agriculture in World War 
II," Canadian Papers in Rural History 4 (1984): 11-32. 
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 Canada's Great Grain Robbery by Don Baron deals with the 1972 American-Soviet sales 
by rebranding the idea of the "great grain robbery" as a uniquely Canadian event. In the end, 
Baron characterizes the entire set-up of the Canadian grain handling system, from the Pool 
elevators to the CWB, as a "great grain robbery."  His contention is the oft-repeated one that the 
system is out-dated and stifles the ability of individual farmers to receive the maximum returns 
from their product. During the time of the 1972 American-Soviet sales, Baron claims that "the 
Soviets returned [to Canada] in 1972 intent on record purchases but found Canada unable to 
deliver the grain, they turned to the U.S. and pulled off their 'Grain Robbery.'"
19
 This claim, 
however, does not match with the account given by Morriss in Chosen Instrument II, the CWB's 
annual report from that year, and the accounts given by former CWB staff members
20
.  These 
accounts all agree that, as one staff member put it, Canadian farmers "did very well."
21
  Never-
the-less Baron's book helped to codify the points that the anti-Board side of the farm community 
had been making vigorously throughout the 1990s about the problems they perceived within the 
Canadian grain system.  In the sections dealing with the Canadian grain system in the 1980s and 
1990s, the book relies mainly on rhetoric and anecdotes for evidence that the Canadian system 
must change.  As Baron writes in the introduction [italics his] "the political shackles are finally 
being ripped off the massive industry. Breath taking change is returning lost freedoms and 
responsibilities to growers and grain companies and the railroads."
22
  Baron sets up former 
United Grain Growers Limited (UGG) president Mac Runciman and the members of the Palliser 
                                                 
19
 Don Baron, Canada's Great Grain Robbery, (Regina: Don Baron Communications, 1998), 145. See also pages 
139-140 for claims of the Canadian system's failure resulting in Soviet traders taking their business to the United 
States in 1972. 
20
 Interview with former CWB staff member, 28 October, 2009 (anonymous source 3).; Interview with former CWB 
staff member, 13 April, 2010 (anonymous source 1).; Interview with former CWB staff member, 13 April, 2010 
(anonymous source 2). 
21
 Interview with former CWB staff member, 13 April, 2010 (anonymous source 2). 
22
 Baron, 8.  
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Wheat Growers Association as crusaders who are struggling to free the Canadian farmers 
ideologically blinded by CWB propaganda.  
 This thesis focuses on the Canadian experience of the 1972 Soviet purchases and how the 
aftermath of the sales was used to polarize the Canadian agricultural community over the 
question of supporting the Canadian Wheat Board’s single-desk selling mandate. The concept for 
this thesis grew out of the ongoing debate over the value and continuing retention of the grain 
handling and marketing system that had been created by western Canadian farmers in the 1920s 
and continued to evolve over the succeeding years.  This system was comprised of the CWB, the 
three prairie grain handling cooperatives known as “wheat pools,” the Canadian Grain 
Commission (CGC), the Canadian International Grains Institute (CIGI) and the Western Grains 
Research Foundation.   
 The Great Grain Robbery catch-phrase was based on historical inaccuracy which was 
used to support an argument made by a small minority of farmers. These anti-Board farmers 
were not part of the larger agrarian protest movement which began in the late 1800s. Agrarian 
protest was focused on collective action and bettering farmers as a whole through working 
together to achieve greater economic power — as demonstrated by the early establishment of 
cooperatives, including the Territorial Grain Growers Association and the three prairie Wheat 
Pools, then later by overwhelming farmer support for the Canadian Wheat Board throughout 
much of the 20th century as well as their long term agitation to have the CWB implemented.
23
 In 
                                                 
23
 For a greater discussion of agrarian protest in western Canada and its resultant economic, political and social 
effects on the region see, for example, V. C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1973).; Bradford Rennie, The Rise of Agrarian Democracy: The United Farmers and 
Farm Women of Alberta 1909-1921,(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).; Paul F. Sharp, The Agrarian 
Revolt in Western Canada, (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1997).; W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party 
in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).; Seymour Lipset, Agrarian Socialism, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1950).; William Kirby Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta, (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1950).; Harold Patton, "The Canadian Grain Pool," Pacific Affairs 3, no. 2 (1930): 165-180.; C. R. 
Fay, "Agricultural Cooperation in the Canadian West," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
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direct opposition to these goals, the anti-Board side was strongly against collective action and 
embraced the ideas of rugged individualism. Secondly, the anti-Board side received significant 
amounts of support and funding from individuals and groups like the Alberta Grain Commission 
who had an economic interest and/or a philosophic belief which placed them in opposition to 
farmers having economic power through collective bargaining.  The CWB Directors' elections 
and the plebiscite on the fate of the CWB's single-desk held in 2011 all reflect the fact that the 
anti-Board side of the farm community is a small minority and the majority of farmers support 
retaining the single-desk. 
 Since the late 1880s western farmers had been expressing strong dissatisfaction with how 
the private grain trade functioned.  After many royal commission investigations and much farmer 
activism, legislation enacting the Canadian Wheat Board as a single-desk selling agency was 
passed in 1935.  This legislation meant that all western grains which came under the CWB’s 
mandate had to be sold through the Board.  This collective marketing ensured that Canadian 
grain was being sold at the optimum price for farmers, which was a direct contrast to the volatile 
grain market experienced by farmers before the CWB.  After harvests, the market would be 
flooded with grain creating a sharp drop in prices that would only recover once the supply of 
grain had been greatly diminished.  Farmers who could afford to delay their sales would reap the 
benefits, while those in more precarious financial positions would be forced by circumstance to 
sell the same grade and quality for less soon after completing their harvests creating substantial 
profits for the grain handling companies and private grain brokers.  The creation of the CWB’s 
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single-desk mandate and the dominance of farmer-owned elevators minimized this inequality 
and the presence of the private grain trade in Canada. 
 The CWB, the three prairie pools, and Canadian Grain Commission were considered to 
be important and useful for western farmers because of their work in selling Canadian grain and 
developing new export markets.  By the end of the 1960s, however, some sections of the 
agricultural community began to question if these institutions were really that useful for western 
farmers. One of the first groups organized in response to the idea that the CWB, along with other 
facets of the Canadian grain industry such as government legislation, were not working in the 
best interests of farmers was the Palliser Wheat Growers Association (PWGA).  Its 1970 
formation led the way for other groups which also questioned the existing status quo of the 
Pools, CWB, and government legislation like the Crow's Nest Pass Freight Rate Agreement 
(commonly referred to as The Crow or Crow Rate).  The PWGA, along with the Alberta Grain 
Commission (AGC), which had been created in the spring of 1972, regarded the CWB’s single-
desk mandate as stifling to the creativity of farmers when it came to the marketing of their grain.  
These groups argued that the CWB prevented individual farmers from selling their grain at the 
highest prices.  
 When the Soviet purchases became public, groups like the PWGA pointed to them as an 
example of Canadian farmers missing out on marketing opportunities.  The initial news reports 
only showed that the Soviets had purchased large quantities of grain without differentiating 
between the prices paid by the Soviets and the profits that had been made by the American grain 
traders through American export subsidies.  Initially, it appeared that the Soviets had been 
paying above-market prices because of the amount of money that had supposedly been made by 
the private trade. Revelations of the Soviets’ demand for grain also pushed the international price 
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upwards.  This increasing international price led to accusations that the CWB had sold Canadian 
grain too soon and too low to allow Canadian farmers to benefit from the increase in market 
prices. The 1972 Soviet purchases consequently became a reference point for critics of the 
CWB’s single-desk mandate.  They claimed that the CWB had cost Canadian farmers money 
instead of increasing their profits as single-desk selling was supposed to do.  The open market, 
where individual Canadian farmers could have sold their grain at anytime, was viewed as having 
been the better option for farmers. 
 This emerging criticism of the Canadian Wheat Board began to create tension within the 
agricultural community and was reflected in the interaction between members of recently created 
farm groups.  There had already been tension due to the creation of Unifarm and the National 
Farmers Union, which were both intended to serve as a voice for the agricultural community on 
the national stage.  The emergence of the Palliser Wheat Growers Association and the Alberta 
government-backed Alberta Grain Commission served to further increase tensions and divide the 
agricultural community.  These tensions manifested in 1982 when the Alberta Cattle 
Commission (ACC) broke with Unifarm.  
 Research for this thesis was divided into two main areas: oral history and documentation. 
Since these events are still recent, many people are still alive who were involved in agricultural 
politics during 1972. This thesis also investigated how long the idea of the great grain robbery 
has stayed active within the Canadian agricultural political community.  Interviews with people 
who were active within agricultural politics were a priority.  Written works can present only a 
portion of the actual level and scope of debate that occurs within the agricultural community 
since the culture of this community has a strong oral component which means that a significant 
amount of the more heated parts of the debate over the Canadian Wheat Board is inaccessible 
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since it took place at farm meetings and other similar gatherings, recordings of which are not 
available.  The principle way to access information about the nuances of the debates which took 
place at these meetings was to interview people who were there since documentation about these 
events, if it is available at all, tends to provide only a summary of the debate.  As part of this 
thesis, therefore, current and former members from farm groups such as the NFU, CWB, and 
Wheat Pools were interviewed.  These members held various positions within the organizations.  
Members of the Western Canadian Wheat Growers (WCWG), the group which grew out of the 
PWGA, were also interviewed.  Contact with people known for being critical of the CWB and 
the overall grain handling and marketing system in western Canada was attempted. Some, but 
not all, of these people declined to be involved in the study or were unable to be contacted.  
Therefore, textual sources and second-hand accounts had to be the primary basis for the work 
that addresses these groups. Overall, the interviews provided information about the 1972 
Canadian experience of grain sales and the Great Grain Robbery in the 1990s. In the formal 
interviews, subjects tended to downplay the most controversial aspects of the topic or request to 
go off the record to talk about them which is why direct quoting is not used extensively. Instead, 
summary paraphrasing of the information provided by multiple interview subjects was used to 
show the general attitudes within the community.   
 The agricultural community  does have a strong written component to its activities which 
complements the verbal portion of their culture. While farmers often meet, formally and 
informally, to discuss issues like the Canadian Wheat Board, they are equally likely to be 
involved with the written portion of a debate over an issue through reading farm newspapers and 
writing letters to the editor. To augment and corroborate the information provided by the 
interviews major American and Canadian newspapers from 1972 were consulted to see how the 
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Soviet purchases had been reported in Canada.  The papers were also searched for articles that 
dealt with the Canadian Wheat Board and internal politics within the Canadian agricultural 
community, in particular any debate about the CWB or the Crow's Nest Pass Freight Rate 
Agreement.  Editorials and letters to the editor were also examined.  The editorials provided 
information on what issues and events were considered noteworthy.  Editorials in the Western 
Producer provided information on what was considered relevant and important for the 
agricultural community.  Letters to the editor brought forward issues that farmers were 
concerned about and showed reactions to editorials, articles, and, most importantly, the opinions 
of other letter-writers.  
 The Soviet purchases of 1972, although financially significant and with far-reaching 
economic and political consequences, have become a relatively overlooked part of agricultural 
history.  If they are mentioned at all it is almost invariably within the context of the American 
experience.  The broader implications for the international grain market and other grain 
exporting countries are ignored.  More significant for Canadian history was how the Soviet grain 
purchases figured within the debates in the agricultural community. Indeed, the meaning of 
“great grain robbery” has itself been transformed to encompass more than just the 1972 Soviet 
purchases and has been used as code for criticizing the Canadian system of grain handling and 
marketing. 
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Chapter Two 
The American Vs. Canadian Experience 
  
 In 1969, Richard Nixon began his first term as President of the United States.  Shortly 
after the Nixon Administration took office, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
learned that the Soviet Union was interested in purchasing American grain.
1
  If the Soviets did 
purchase grain, it would be a coup for the new administration.  Nixon could claim that it would 
lead to considerable profits for American farmers and grain companies.  Ignoring the fact the 
Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) had already been supplying grain to both the Soviet Union
2
 and 
China
3
, Henry Kissinger wrote, “it would be a major political success to demonstrate the 
superiority of our system by selling the Soviet Union the grain it could not grow for itself.” 4  
The groundwork for the highly publicized grain deal of 1972 had started in 1969 with the 
Soviets’ expression of interest in grain purchases from the US.   
 There were several barriers to trade with Communist countries, much to the irritation of 
U.S. exporters.  Since the Soviets and the Americans were cautiously beginning to relax the 
tensions between them
5
, the first step to lowering these barriers to trade with a Communist nation 
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was changing the 1949 Export Control Act.  In 1969 the Export Administration Act, designed to 
allow more open trade, was passed.  The Soviets, however, were still unwilling to pursue any 
significant purchasing agreement with the United States because of a restriction placed on 
shipping by the Kennedy administration in 1963.  This restriction stated that “50 percent of all 
grain sold to the Soviet Union had to be transported in American vessels.” 6  The Soviets found 
this condition prohibitively expensive, especially when they could purchase grain from Canada 
and other countries, without having this requirement added to their transportation costs.  Given 
that the maritime unions were unwilling to allow the restriction to be removed, there was little 
reason for Nixon to lift it unless the Soviet Union was inclined to buy large amounts of 
American grain.  The economic and political benefits from these sales would provide Nixon with 
the motive to set aside the protection for American maritime workers.
7
   The impetus for the 
removal would occur in 1971. 
 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) had been stalled for some time when, on 20 
May 1971, Nixon triumphantly announced an advance in the negotiations.  This advance had 
occurred due to backroom deals made between the United States and the Soviet Union, not 
through diplomatic channels.  To the consternation of the diplomats, the wording in the 
agreement was so imprecise that it made the agreement vulnerable to subjective interpretation.
8
  
Anatoliy Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador, had told Nixon that without some type of 
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arrangement for grain sales, the Soviets would not consider any SALT agreement.
9
 Working 
with this ultimatum, Kissinger made a deal with the Soviet Union whereby the Americans would 
sell them grain if they would agree to begin negotiating an arms agreement.  The terms of the 
grain deal were not made during this backroom arrangement; instead, an actual agreement was 
left for further negotiations.
10
  Both sides acknowledged, however, that the Soviets should not 
pay a premium price to transport any American grain that they purchased.  Additionally, 
Kissinger believed that a grain deal would be an important part of the détente between the two 
countries, since it would increase American export revenue.
11
 
 The SALT breakthrough gave Nixon a much-needed political boost.  Nixon was 
scheduled to go to Moscow in the late spring of 1972 for a summit.  The summit’s timing was 
concurrent with the Democratic National Convention.
12
  Thus, Nixon was able to overshadow his 
anti-war political rivals while continuing to build a success story for his 1972 re-election 
campaign. For the summit to be a complete success for Nixon, it would need to settle any 
outstanding SALT problems.  In accordance with the earlier backroom deal, the Soviets were 
willing to resolve any issues, so long as the United States would sell them grain.
13
  Nixon and 
Kissinger were perfectly willing to ensure the grain sales would happen, so long as Nixon was 
re-elected.  To get re-elected he needed the summit to be spectacularly successful so that he 
would have ammunition for his presidential campaign.  For grain, the  Soviets were happy to 
oblige with an ambiguously worded treaty. In May 1972, the summit occurred with clockwork 
precision and Nixon signed the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
14
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 In order for the United States to uphold its side of the bargain, the first thing that had to 
be done was to remove the 1963 Kennedy shipping restrictions.  The maritime unions were very 
much against this move because it would negatively affect their members.
15
  The Nixon 
administration was undaunted, however, and on 10 June 1971, it repealed the Kennedy order.
16
  
At the same time, it removed the requirement for companies to obtain permission from the 
Department of Commerce to export to a Communist country so by the end of 1971, all the 
hurdles to the purchasing of American grain by the Soviets had been removed.
17
 
 The grain deal could not have come at a better time for the Americans and Soviets.  With 
the pending election in the United States, Nixon was eagerly waiting for a profitable grain sale to 
swing the votes of the agricultural community in his favour.  The Soviets needed the sales to 
make up for the crop shortage that was being predicted for 1972.  Fortunately, the United States 
was predicting a bumper crop.
18
  However, the projection of a large American grain harvest, with 
demand for grain apparently remaining similar to previous years, decreased the price of grain on 
the futures markets.  The lower futures prices meant that current grain prices decreased as well.  
Soviet grain buyers were able to take advantage of these lower prices in their negotiations with 
the American government and the private trade.  With the success of SALT supporting Nixon’s 
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election campaign, the Soviets came to Washington to negotiate a grain sale and as a spin-off 
gave Nixon’s campaign an additional positive boost.  This grain sale, from American 
government strategic reserves, would be heralded as the beginning of reconciliation between the 
two superpowers.
19
  
 Even though the Soviets wanted to purchase American grain, and the purchases had been 
clandestinely approved during SALT in 1971, the negotiations still went slowly.  The main 
problem in the negotiations was that the Soviets did not want to pay the standard Commodity 
Credit Corporation (CCC) interest rate of 6.125 percent for the loan the United States would give 
them to finance their purchases.
20
   But when the Soviets finally realized the extent of their crop 
failure on June 25,
21
 they became much more cooperative.  They did not want any uprisings 
occurring, should there be a food shortage, and they did not want to lower their livestock 
numbers because of a feed grain shortage.  On 29 June 1972, Nikolai Belousov and the rest of 
the Soviet negotiating team returned to Washington, where they informed the USDA that the 
Soviet Union was going to agree to the credit offer, and once the final terms of the agreement 
had been reached, they would sign it.
22
   On 5 July the USDA received an extremely negative 
report on the Soviet harvest potential for 1972 from the American ambassador’s office in 
Moscow.  This report would eventually prove to have greatly overestimated the harvest. At the 
time, though, the negotiators dismissed it because it seemed too negative.
23
  USDA General 
Counsel Claude Coffman and the Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Carroll G. Brunthaver were 
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the only people, other than Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, who knew the Soviets were 
willing to negotiate, and they were instructed by Butz not to circulate the information.
24
  
 The grain sales agreement between the Soviets and the Americans was publically 
announced on 8 July 1972.  A jubilant Earl Butz stated: “This is by all odds the greatest grain 
transaction in the history of the world.  And it certainly is the greatest for us.”25  In theory, the 
agreement was to run from 1 August 1972 to 31 July 1975, with the Soviets purchasing a 
maximum of $750 million worth of grain.  To aid the Soviet purchases, the CCC was to grant 
them up to $750 million of credit.  The total volume of the sales would make the Soviets the 
largest customer for American grain in the world.
26
  The agreement was not put before a 
government review committee as would have normally happened when such a large agreement 
was made.  Since it was an election year, Nixon was quite happy to let Butz quietly finalize the 
deal in time for good public relations with the agricultural sector.  Butz was so adamant about 
keeping it secret, that even Peter Peterson, the American Secretary of Commerce, did not learn 
about the deal until it was publicly announced, even though he was supposed to be in economic 
negotiations with the Soviets at the time.
27
   
 The Soviets had their own reasons for keeping the deal secret.  In 1972, the deal with 
Washington was not the only American grain deal that the Soviets were making.  On July 5, 
three days before the agreement with the American government was to be announced, the 
Soviets “signed contracts with Continental Grain Company to buy 4.5 million tons of corn, 3.65 
million tons of hard winter wheat, and 350,000 tons of soft white wheat.”28  The government 
negotiators working on the agreement did not know about this private sale, nor did they suspect 
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that the Soviets had planned to buy additional grain outside the volume that was agreed upon 
with the US government.
29
  The Soviets needed to keep their dealings secret to prevent the price 
increases that would happen if the grain marketers realized how bad the projected Soviet harvest 
was and consequently, how great the Soviet demand for grain would be.
30
  The government 
negotiators lacked this information, and so they did not realize the strength of their bargaining 
position.  Kissinger would woefully write:  “Our intelligence about Soviet needs was appalling.  
Our knowledge of what was happening in our markets was skimpy.  The US government was 
simply not organized at that time to supervise or even monitor private grain sales as a foreign 
policy matter.  The Soviets beat us at our own game.”31    
 The Soviets used their central buying agency to take advantage of the competitiveness of 
the American grain market.  Since each grain company and the American government wanted to 
ensure that their deals with the Soviets stayed secret, the Soviets were able to give the impression 
to the companies and the government that they had made a deal only with the group that they 
happened to be negotiating with at the time.
32
  The companies, the government, and the Soviets 
all agreed that in order for the price of wheat to be kept low, the farmers and small traders had to 
be ignorant of the Soviets’ purchasing intentions.  Earl Butz, whose reputation painted him as 
fiercely protective of farmers, made sure that no news of the upcoming Soviet sales was leaked 
from the government. The grain companies, always noted for their secrecy, continued to operate 
out of view of the public and the government.
33
  The market structure of the American grain 
trade enabled the various private traders and the government into keeping their actions secret 
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from each other, because they otherwise risked influencing the price of grain as their competitors 
tried to turn their actions into an advantageous situation for themselves.  
 Secrecy was very important to any company or group selling into the international grain 
market so that they could avoid being undersold by their competitors. This need to prevent their 
competition from knowing their selling price also applied to the Canadian Wheat Board since it 
was competing against the American-based grain companies who were selling to the Soviets as 
well.  Equally as important to groups working in the international grain market as keeping their 
selling prices secret was keeping their sales and the exact quantities and qualities sold secret 
from their competitors. Any data about sales conducted by one company could, and likely would 
be, used by their competitors to gain a sales advantage.  It was, therefore, important to the 
Canadian Wheat Board to work with as much secrecy as the private trade did since it was 
competing with the private companies to sell grain into the international marketplace. 
 In 1972 there was an additional reason for the American government to support and 
encourage secrecy around the Soviet purchases. Carry-over grain stocks were high in America 
and in the other major grain exporting countries.
34
 The high carry-over stocks coupled with a 
generally stable level of demand each year meant that the international price stayed relatively 
low.  While the yearly harvest yields did have a noticeable effect on prices, continual availability 
of the carry-over supplies meant that the affect of the harvest yields on international prices was 
always slightly dampened.
35
  The American export subsidy program was meant to help offset the 
low international prices by providing companies with incentives to pay higher domestic grain 
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prices even though the companies would be selling the grain at the lower prices of the 
international market.  The Soviet's high demand enabled more of the world's grain carry-over 
stocks to be disposed of in a single year instead of the slow drawing down of the stocks that had 
been the previous norm.  If knowledge of the high level of demand created by the Soviet crop 
failures had become widespread then the fact that carry-over stocks were large may have served 
to keep the international price from rising due to anticipated increased demand relative to the 
amount of grain available to supply it. It was in the American government's interest, as well as 
the interests of international grain trading companies, to decrease the overall carry-over stocks so 
that in the long-term the market would be more likely to level off at a higher price point than it 
had in previous years because of the available supply volume being lessened. Additionally, the 
private trade benefited from the export subsidies which focused on moving large volumes of 
grain and the margin between their purchasing price and their selling price. Consequently being 
able to sell a greater than expected volume of grain from the carry-over stocks was to their 
pecuniary advantage. 
 Back in late June 1972, when the negotiations for a serious agreement began, the Soviets 
had contacted Continental and several other large grain companies with the express intention of 
purchasing large quantities of grain.  The grain companies and the Soviets would continue to 
negotiate secretly, while the deal with the American government was being finalized.  These 
negotiations would be kept secret from the government, leaving their negotiators to rely on 
imperfect information.  
 Continental was always cautious and needed to make sure that if they did sell to the 
Soviets, they would profit.  To make a good profit, Continental needed to assure itself that 
American government subsidies would continue, even if the price of grain rose.  Under this 
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subsidy arrangement, if the price for domestic wheat was higher than export wheat, the subsidies 
made up the difference.
36
  Continental knew that the price of domestic and export grain would 
increase once it began purchasing stocks to sell to the Soviets.  Therefore, it was imperative for 
them to determine if the government would keep the subsidies in place even with a price 
increase.  If the subsidies were discontinued, the fixed-price agreement that was being negotiated 
with the Soviets would leave Continental in the unfortunate position of acquiring expensive 
domestic grain, and then selling it at a loss.  Continental sent Bernard Steinweg, the head of its 
New York branch, to visit the Undersecretary of Agriculture, Carroll Brunthaver.
37
  Steinweg 
was told that the government was prepared to continue its subsidies, which meant that 
Continental was free to close its deal with the Soviets, which it did on 5 July 1972.
38
  The 
government negotiators were never informed of the events of this meeting, even though it 
pointed to the possibility of Soviet grain deals with the private trade.  On 8 July 1972, the Soviets 
purchased 1 million tons of grain from Cargill and another 570,000 tons from Louis Dreyfus.
39
 
 Due to the secrecy surrounding the various deals that the Soviets had made, it was not 
until after 8 July, that the problems within the American grain market became obvious.  The 
Soviets, instead of buying the $200 million worth of grain the government assumed would be 
purchased within the first year, had purchased $750 million with the aid of the credit extended 
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from the CCC.  The Soviets saved their hard currency for dealing with the private traders.  
Within the next two months the Soviets procured an additional 400 million bushels of grain.
40
   
 While the grain companies were making a healthy profit from the Soviets, the American 
government was also adding to their profits on each sale by making subsidy payments.  The 
grain companies were selling American wheat at prices that “congressional experts remarked 
later, [were] ‘unrealistically low’.”41  The companies were able to dismiss the small profit margin 
provided by these low prices, because of the subsidies they were getting from the American 
government which pushed their low profit margin upwards. These profit-margin increasing 
subsidies were paid to entice the companies to buy grain domestically for resale internationally.  
The system for the subsidies was set up so that companies could speculate on the actual subsidy, 
much like the set-up of the futures markets.  A company could apply for the subsidy before or 
after it shipped the grain it had contracted to sell.  A company applied for the subsidy after it 
shipped its product, if it believed that the domestic wheat price would rise, or the export price 
would fall.  If either, or both, of these events occurred, the subsidy that the government would 
pay out would also increase to offset the cost of purchasing domestically and selling into the 
export market.
42
  The subsidies during 1972 were “some of the highest subsidies in history”43 
and pushed up the profit margins of the companies involved. 
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 As knowledge about the Soviet purchases emerged, the export price began to rise so that 
it came closer to the American domestic price.  In theory, the subsidies ought to have been ended 
once the two prices began to become equal to each other.  Nixon, however, still had the 7 
November election looming on the horizon, and removing subsidies would not endear him to the 
farmers or to the companies.  The subsidies to the companies helped to keep the American export 
price around $1.65 per bushel which under-cut foreign competitors. The two main competitors 
were the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board. They both sent delegates to 
the USDA to ask it to effectively increase the American export price by lowering or 
discontinuing the subsidies.
44
  The subsidies distorted the market prices and CWB officials had 
many informal discussions with various members of the USDA on the subject even before 
1972.
45
 The subsidy also allowed the Soviets to purchase the American grain at a discount.
46
  
The USDA, however, did not see a problem with this market distortion and it kept the subsidies 
at the same level, just as Carroll Brunthaver had informed Continental earlier that year that it 
would.  1972 was an election year which meant that there would not have been any attempt to 
lower or remove the subsidy since that would have hurt the profits of export grain companies.
47
 
But this price manipulation increased domestic prices for the grain, as the United States began to 
suffer from an internal grain shortage as a result of the large Soviet purchases.  Consequently, the 
cost of food, especially milk, meats, and cereal products, increased toward the end of the year.  
These price increases also nudged inflation upwards.
48
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 The USDA was not just content to provide domestic subsidies and credit sales to the 
Soviets; it also aided the private trade.  When Continental was looking for 60 million bushels of 
wheat at the end of August, the USDA provided it from its strategic reserve at below market 
cost.
49
  Continental, of course, collected a subsidy payment on the wheat when it was exported.  
By the end of 1972, the United States government had paid the grain companies several hundred 
million dollars in export subsidies. There is no definite amount for the subsidies.  The academic 
Roger Porter places the total subsidies paid out at more than $300 million.  According to Porter, 
this figure also takes into account the $46 million shipping subsidy that was used to compensate 
for the fact that the Soviets were transporting the grain on Soviet ships, instead of American 
ones.  Economist Carl J. Schramn reports that the total subsidies were, at the very least, $400 
million,
50
 while journalist Tad Szulc puts the amount down to only $200 million.  It appears that 
Szulc’s figure does not calculate subsidies given for grains not purchased by the Soviets or the 
shipping subsidy.
51
 Continental Grain Company would have indirectly received part of the $46 
million shipping subsidy, since Stellar Navigation Company was one of its branches.  Stellar 
Navigation was responsible for chartering ships to deliver grain to the Soviet Union. While 
Cargill also possessed a transportation branch, it was never made clear if its transportation 
branch received any portion of the shipping subsidy.
52
    
Even though it was an election year, the USDA and the United States Treasury came to 
the conclusion that it was not possible for the government to continue to pay such large subsidies 
indefinitely.
53
 It was therefore decided that the subsidies would be reduced on 1 September, and 
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gradually phased out.  Luckily for the exporters, the USDA warned them on 25 August that they 
could only claim the maximum subsidy value until 1 September 1972.  The exporters, 
accustomed to speculating on the subsidies, were faced with a potential loss of profit.  Within the 
next six days they applied for subsidies for a total “282 million bushels (7.67 million metric tons) 
of wheat...167 million (4.55 million metric tons) of them destined for the Soviet Union.”54 The 
reduction of the export subsidies accompanied the end of the sale of 724 million bushels of grain 
to the Soviets.
55
    
September brought with it growing public indignation over what seemed to be a far too 
intimate relationship between the grain exporting companies and the United States government. 
There was also the curious lack of information possessed by the USDA in its own negotiations 
with the Soviets.  The House of Representatives convened a subcommittee that began hearings 
on the sales on 14 September 1972.
56
  Fortunately for Nixon, the subcommittee was merely a 
cosmetic display.  It did not find any incriminating information and chose not to investigate the 
contacts between the USDA and the export grain companies.
57
  These hearings pacified the 
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public.  The uproar over increased food prices nominally caused by a domestic grain shortage 
died down and any questions about improper relations were smoothed over.  The House 
subcommittee found that the farmers were correct in complaining that they could have made 
larger profits
58
 if they had been informed earlier and more accurately about the Soviet purchases.  
It decided, however, that the farmers “had had the potential for information and made their own 
individual judgements.”59   Additionally, the Soviets would continue to purchase grain from the 
United States, so the farmers could profit from those sales. Happily, for the Nixon campaign, the 
general public possessed a short memory.  This short memory was coupled with a propaganda 
campaign that portrayed the grain sales as a great and continuing boon to the economy. So the 
American outrage over the sales faded quietly away to be replaced with the idea that America 
had triumphed over the Soviets once again.   
 In addition to engineering this apparent financial success for the United States, President 
Nixon had succeeded with SALT and managed to have a summit in Moscow.  The Moscow 
summit had given Nixon solid foreign policy results for his campaign.  As he told Congress 
when he returned on 1 June, SALT, the ABM Treaty, and the other agreements “represented ‘the 
first step toward a new era’.”60 The Moscow summit had made Nixon appear to voters as a 
peacemaker.
61
  Even maritime union leader, Teddy Gleason, once a vocal anti-Communist, threw 
his support behind Nixon and endorsed the grain sales to the Soviets.
62
 Once Nixon’s 
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peacemaking actions were added to the illusionary financial benefit the grains sales had given the 
United States, it seemed obvious which candidate should be elected.  On 7 November 1972 
Nixon was re-elected in a landslide victory.  It was only later that some of the American public 
would come to realize the full effect of the Soviet's purchases and their own government's 
involvement in them.   
 Unlike their American counterparts, Canadian farmers had a much different experience 
with the 1972 Soviet grain purchases. Canadian farmers knew that the Canadian Wheat Board 
was making sales to the Soviets during 1972.  These sales were unremarkable for Canadian 
farmers who saw the sales as merely another instance of the CWB acting on their behalf. They 
were not concerned by Soviet purchases or the prices the Soviets were paying for Canadian 
grain.  There were other issues and concerns within the Canadian agricultural community which 
were more important to farmers and received the majority of their attention.  
 At the time Canadian farmers were being served by the Alberta Wheat Pool, 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, and Manitoba Wheat Pool, in cooperation with the Canadian Wheat 
Board.  Canadian farmers had become accustomed to working with these institutions and to the 
structure of the grain trade on the prairies since the end of the Second World War.  The Wheat 
Pools provided farmers in each province with a network of delivery points as well as a structure 
around which to organize and socialize.  The slight uncertainty of the Canadian Wheat Board's 
continued existence had been removed in 1967 when, with enthusiastic support from all parties, 
the legislation had been amended so that it no longer required a Parliamentary vote every five 
years to renew it. Even before the 1967 amendment there had been little doubt that each 
Parliamentary vote would reaffirm the CWB's single-desk mandate since the only time the vote 
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had not been unanimously in favour had been in 1947 when seven "no" votes had been cast by 
members from Ontario and Quebec.
63
  
 With the issue of the Canadian Wheat Board's continuing operation apparently decided 
western farmers shifted their focus to other agricultural issues. The Board worked, the majority 
of farmers believed, in their best interests and needed no intervention from farmers now that the 
1967 amendment was in place. The structure of the Pools was solid and most farmers were 
content with it.
64
 The western agricultural community was focused on the creation of more 
groups which would benefit farmers.  In Alberta the Farmers Union of Alberta (FUA) was 
working towards the creation of more provincial marketing boards for everything from hogs to 
vegetables.
65
 Meanwhile the provincial farmers' unions in British Columbia, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, and Ontario had merged into the National Farmers Union (NFU) in 1969 in order 
to have a stronger and more unified voice in federal lobbying efforts.  The following year in 
1970 an Act of Parliament officially recognized the charter of the NFU.   
 Within the western Canadian agricultural community there had always been a small 
minority of farmers who were ideologically opposed to the single-desk selling model of the 
Canadian Wheat Board.  In 1970 a group of farmers and others who believed that agricultural 
policy in Canada, including the CWB's mandate, were no longer providing farmers with 
opportunities but was instead handicapping them from making an optimum profit, formed the 
Palliser Wheat Growers Association (PWGA).
66
  The PWGA was the first in a string of groups
67
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all with similar mandates and over lapping membership
68
 that would be formed throughout the 
next few decades. Of these groups, the Western Barley Growers Association [WBGA] formed in 
1977 to "encourage the re-establishment of an open grain marketing system"
69
, became one of 
the longest lasting with a vocal and highly visible presence in the media and the agricultural 
community at large.
70
  
The PWGA officially says they were formed with “the first policy objective...to obtain 
premiums on wheat.”71 The details of why and how the group was formed, however, are more 
nebulous since there is at present no official detailed history for the group. The most common 
explanation for the group’s formation is that the initial members could not understand why there 
was a surplus of grain on the western Canadian prairies that could not be sold and American 
elevators were offering higher prices
72
 than the CWB.
73
 Like Ed Partridge, one of the founders of 
the Territorial Grain Growers Association and the Grain Growers' Grain Company
74
 many years 
before, the PWGA went on a fact-finding mission to the Winnipeg Grain Exchange.  Its 
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members also went to Ottawa in search of answers.  They came to opposite conclusions from 
Partridge: namely that the CWB was the problem and the open market represented by the grain 
companies and the Exchange was the solution.  Mac Runciman, who was the then president of 
the United Grain Growers (UGG), had already been campaigning against the current status quo 
in the Canadian grain industry
75
 and the PWGA members found him to be an informative and 
useful ally because of his experience and industry connections.  The PWGA agreed with 
Runciman’s conclusion that the surplus grain still in storage on the prairies “arose more from 
marketing policies than from a lack of boxcars.”76  While this conclusion sounded logical at first, 
it failed to account for the problem that releasing such a large surplus into the market all at once 
would cause a price crash.  Even for the grain market the law of supply and demand could not be 
surmounted.  The policy of the CWB was to provide a steady trickle of Canadian grain to the 
market in order to gradually bring down the carry-over surplus.  CWB officials were deeply 
concerned that releasing too much grain too fast would cause a serious price crash from which 
the market would be slow to recover.
77
 This concern over grain flooding the market and the 
resulting price crash was why the Soviet sales which brought down the carry-over stocks were 
considered to be so useful because the large sales allowed the CWB to quickly lower the carry-
over instead of having to continue to do so gradually.    
 The perceived discrepancy between the American elevator spot prices and the CWB 
pooled prices was another area where the PWGA’s theory that the open market produced better 
prices than the single-desk initially looked plausible but did not stand up to greater scrutiny.  
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American grain prices could not be compared directly to Canadian grain prices because 
American grain was not priced the same way as Canadian grain. To compare prices several 
factors must be taken into account in addition to the exchange rate between the American and 
Canadian dollars. Fundamentally, the prices at American elevators were spot prices not the 
aggregated and weighted pooled price the CWB offered farmers.
78
 Since the spot price is a price 
at a specific point in time and the pooled price
79
 is the average difference between different 
classes and grades over a set time period the comparison of the two types of prices is an 
exceedingly complex technical problem.   Furthermore, American farmers and the USDA did 
not want Canadian farmers to sell their grain into the American system when there was already 
surplus carry-over stocks in the United States. That action would serve only to decrease 
American prices and clog up the American transportation and handling system including 
terminals and elevators.  There was also no guarantee that if a Canadian farmer did get their 
grain to an American elevator they would arrive in time to receive the spot price for their grain 
since the spot price could change quickly throughout a single day. Nevertheless, these factors did 
not prevent PWGA members from looking at American prices as an example of the CWB's 
failure in the grain market.
80
 
 By 1972 there were other issues at play within the agricultural community which took 
precedence for farmers.  These issues, however, were indirectly related to the debate over the 
Canadian Wheat Board.  The NFU was quickly rising to prominence within the farm community 
as an organization that demanded attention.  It and the Alberta-based Unifarm were embroiled in 
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a very public and often heated debate over the question of whether Unifarm should join the NFU 
or continue on its own.  This debate was widely covered in the farm press.  The letters section of 
the Western Producer, the largest of the farm papers, frequently printed letters that expounded on 
the benefits of Unifarm and decried the idea of joining with the NFU or vice versa. The debate 
over Unifarm vs. the NFU was not confined to the Western Producer as many papers with rural 
readership printed letters on the subject.
81
  Writer John Schmidt devoted his column 
"Agricultural Alberta" in the Calgary Herald to attacking the NFU as an untrustworthy 
organization with close ties to the Communist Party of Canada and therefore the Soviet 
Commiform.
82
  While Schmidt did not give Unifarm any notable support in his columns he did 
not single it out as a hotbed of Communist activity which, he felt, sensible farmers would avoid 
at all costs. The underlying message of his columns was that if a farmer felt it necessary to 
belong to either organization it would be wiser to belong to Unifarm.    
 Schmidt's attacks on the NFU were part of an on-going trend of trying to discredit the 
NFU and its policies by characterizing it as communist, or in later decades as socialist.  Since the 
NFU vocally supported the CWB, communist fear mongering about the NFU also indirectly 
implicated the CWB too, and this implication dove-tailed with anti-Board claims the CWB was a 
Communist organization that took away farmers' freedom.  John Channon's remarks that he 
needed "to find a new mailing address for the CWB — [in] Moscow"83 fit into this mentality and 
also supported it because Channon was part of the Alberta Grain Commission not just a random 
individual. While The Producer was publishing stories about Brazil importing more Canadian 
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wheat
84
 or reports of grain exports to the Soviet Union
85
 Schmidt continued to focus on the 
dangers of Communists.
86
  To that end, he provided a four-part account by supposed insiders 
from the NFU showing how it had ties to the Soviets and embraced Communism. The account, 
as presented by Schmidt, was from James Rawe, who was "Alberta director of organization"
87
 
for the NFU between 1969 and 1970 and Bob Cheshire who was a regional coordinator.
88
 
According to Schmidt, Rawe believed that “Canadians are not fully aware of the lengths to 
which the Communist party of Canada have gone to take over this Canadian farm 
organization."
89  
Rawe's account opened with a hint of the scandalous when he recalled, "It was 
there I saw my first copy of a Communist journal, Mass Line, which was being distributed within 
the [NFU's 1969 founding] convention,"
90
  Rawe detailed how he had been given lists of Alberta 
farmers by the NFU who he discovered were Communists and how Cheshire and Bert Simmons, 
another NFU regional coordinator, told him their suspicions about Communist money funding 
the NFU.  He explained how he and Cheshire were not able to remain silent after they witnessed 
Simmons being "purged off the national NFU board"
91
 and they could not in good conscience 
stand idly by so they "contacted Canadian security authorities and gave them a report. Rawe 
continued to report to these authorities."
92
 His discovery of a "mimeographed mailing from the 
Communist Party of Canada"
93
 was the final piece of evidence that confirmed his fears and 
shortly after he parted ways with the NFU.   
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 Rawe's exact status with the NFU was a source of contention since agreement could not 
be reached on if he was a member or a hired organizer.  This question, rather than the 
accusations of the NFU's Communist ties, was still a major issue by August of 1972 with 
William Dascavich writing in a letter to the Editor of The Enterprise "[i]t is generally 
ASSUMED that he was a member of the NFU. THE TRUTH IS THAT HE NEVER WAS A 
MEMBER. . . . Cheshire resigned. Rawe was fired.  He deserved it.  The NFU in Alberta is 
better off because of it."
94
  The question of the NFU's potential Communist ties was a strictly 
Canadian event which was given more importance than the American-Soviet grain deals by the 
Canadian agricultural community, particularly the Alberta agricultural community. These anti-
Communist attacks on the NFU were part of a growing tradition of opponents of pro-CWB 
organizations accusing the organizations and the CWB of being Communist. Schmidt's columns 
describing the NFU as being a hot bed of subversion and Communist activity implied that any 
policy or organization supported by the NFU was also Communist. Echoing the basic ideas of 
American McCarthyism, the implication was that the NFU and its members were un-Canadian in 
their thoughts and deeds. The implication was strongly reflected back on the CWB.  To some 
members of the agricultural community Communist was synonymous with a lack of freedom.  
This idea — that the CWB was Communist — complimented the anti-Board side's argument that 
the CWB prevented farmers from being truly free to sell their own product and maximize their 
returns.  Accusations of Communism leveled at the NFU transferred to the CWB  partly because 
of the way Communist fear mongering complimented the messaging of the anti-Board side. 
Additionally, accusing the NFU and its members of being Communist, was an attempt to 
discredit them and the policies and programs, like the CWB, they supported. Members of anti-
Board groups, such as the Alberta Grain Commission and the WCWG, played up fears of 
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Communism or Socialism in their messages about the CWB and its supporters like the NFU.  
This style of attack was rooted in Alberta political culture where accusations of Communism or 
Socialism carried into the 1990s.
95
    
 In 1972 the majority of western Canadian farmers were not focused on the international 
grain market particularly the market outside of North America.  As they had done in previous 
years they trusted the CWB to look after their best interests. Instead their attention was turned to 
the rapeseed
96
 futures market. Publically funded breeding programs had lowered the acid content 
of rapeseed so that by 1972 it was assumed that it would be making large inroads into both the 
human and animal markets.  Naturally, this assumption led to increased speculation in rapeseed 
futures that crop year.  The Winnipeg futures market moved briskly until prices plunged without 
explanation.  The prices remained low until the final weeks of the crop year when they spiked 
sharply. What had looked like a high-return crop when it was planted in the spring had suddenly 
turned into a loss. Farmers wanted an explanation for the plunge in rapeseed prices. The 
movements of the futures market were considered to be highly suspicious and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) began investigations.
97
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 Western Canadian farmers, many of who had grown or were contemplating growing 
rapeseed, watched the news for any new developments.  The Soviet grain purchases that were 
leading up to the "Great Grain Robbery" were of little concern for Canadian grain farmers since 
the CWB dealt with those grains, whereas the CWB had no mandate to deal with rapeseed which 
meant that farmers themselves were watching the market for rapeseed. Eventually the RCMP 
investigation concluded that there was not enough information to go forward with criminal 
proceedings but some farmers still felt a swindle had taken place.
98
 
 Even before the price shifts in rapeseed there had been some discussion within the 
agricultural community that rapeseed should become a "Board grain" and be placed under the 
CWB's mandate just like wheat, oats, and barley. Since the Wheat Board was consistently 
returning profits to farmers, it was easier to contract with the CWB than it was for the individual 
farmer to play the market.  The significant price shifts in 1972 which hurt many farmer-sellers 
provided a fresh impetus for renewed advocacy to make rapeseed a Board grain.  This advocacy 
continued into 1973 when the federal government finally decided to conduct a poll to gauge how 
many farmers would support rapeseed becoming part of the CWB's mandate.  
 George Turner, who had been the President of Manitoba Pool Elevators, was given the 
task of handling the mail-in poll on the future of rapeseed sales by Agriculture Minister Otto 
Lang in October 1973.  Immediately, both the pro- and anti-single-desk sides of the agricultural 
community increased their campaigning to influence the way farmers would vote on the rapeseed 
question.
99
  The National Farmers Union and the three prairie Pools were all in favour of placing 
rapeseed under the single-desk while the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange and The Rapeseed 
Association of Canada (RAC), which would later change its name to the Canola Council of 
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Canada, were vehemently opposed to the idea.  RAC's members
100
 included rapeseed processors 
who would have been negatively affected by having to purchase Canadian rapeseed through the 
single-desk system instead of the open market system that was currently in effect.  RAC placed a 
full page ad in the Western Producer which featured six rapeseed farmers from across the three 
prairie provinces giving testimonials on why they would not support putting rapeseed under the 
CWB's mandate.
101
   The testimonials included many of the ideas and much of the language that 
became a feature of the debate over the Canadian Wheat Board over the next decades. A farmer 
identified as Jack Deck of Brooksby, Saskatchewan was quoted as saying "I think by going 
under the Wheat Board I'm losing my freedom.  I like to stay an individual and make my own 
decisions."
 102
  The idea that the CWB took away individual freedom would be one of the most 
consistent messages of the anti-Board faction throughout the 1990s with the Farmers for Justice 
and into the CWB director election campaigns of the 2000s. 
 Those who supported putting rapeseed under the Wheat Board's mandate shifted their 
language to reply to the freedom and liberty rhetoric.  One letter-writer warned that opponents of 
making rapeseed a Board grain were making a "last ditch stand to seduce Canadian Rapeseed 
Growers into perpetual servitude under the so-called "Open Market" system of selling 
rapeseed."
103
  Many proponents of putting rapeseed under the single-desk also lamented that the 
opposing side seemed to be either ignorant of or forgetting their own history when it came to 
farmers dealing with the open market.  One writer, identifying himself only as Scotty, wrote 
"The young people can't remember the old battles we had for the Pools and orderly marketing. 
They can't remember some of them never having the Pool and Wheat and there is a danger that 
                                                 
100
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they will not value them as they should be."
 104
  These writers turned to history to give their 
replies weight and while this reference to the history of the western Canadian farm community 
did not silence the opposition, the opponents tended to leave the points made by such letters 
unanswered.   Instead, open market supporters retaliated with counter-claims that the Pools, 
federal government, and CWB were covering up bad managers and the western farmers were 
getting less than they deserved.  L. K. Walker maintained, "[f]or 35 years you [supporters of 
orderly marketing] have snowed us with endless and ever-weakening defenses of a system that 
will not stand a close examination.  The blunders, bungles, fire-sale prices, political expediency 
and motivation, sell-outs and misrepresentation may not be visible to those who main interest is 
the promotion of a complete authoritarian agricultural industry, but anyone; who has farmed all 
his life knows that he has been exploited and by whom."
 105
 
 Dollars and cents always surface when two sides are disagreeing over accusations of 
financial mismanagement, and this case was no exception. The idea that the CWB was not 
securing for farmers the prices they truly deserved had been brought up in the western farm 
community before
106
 the rapeseed vote, and those earlier ideas were incorporated into the 
arguments over making rapeseed a Board grain.  The President of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 
"Mr. [E.K. "Ted"] Turner said the Canadian Wheat Board is currently selling wheat for a dollar a 
bushel more than the U.S. is getting through deals made by the private grain trade with the 
Soviet Union and others.  If the farmer gets a higher price in the U.S. it is because of government 
support and not because any particular skill was shown in marketing American wheat."
107
 
Turner's reference was one of the few allusions to the 1972 Soviet-American grain deals during 
                                                 
104
 "Scotty", "Lesson of 58 Years," Western Producer, 13 December 1973, 29. 
105
 L.K. Walker, "Open Market Proponent," Western Producer, 13 December 1973, 29. 
106
 Interview with Brian Otto 4 September, 2009.; Interview with Doug Campbell, 24 February 2010 and 16 March 
2010. 
107
 "Free Market System not best" Western Producer December 13, 1973, pg.7 
 45 
 
 
the debate over making rapeseed a Board grain. For western farmers on both sides of the debate 
the most important point Turner had made was that American farmers got "government 
support"
108
  not the higher price the CWB was receiving from buyers. The idea that American 
farmers succeeded at selling their grain on the open market and made up any difference in price 
with government subsidies was attractive to the anti-Board faction, especially when they were 
arguing that rapeseed did not need to be a Board grain. Government subsidies were more 
palatable than the CWB to these groups because the use of government subsidies would allow 
for the continuation of the private market.  They were certain that the single-desk approach of the 
CWB constituted too much government interference in farmers' business, whereas the open 
market augmented by the occasional American style government subsidies would be the perfect 
balance between government involvement and producer choice.
109
 
 It would be erroneous to assume that the Canadian agricultural community simply did not 
know about the Soviet-American sales and therefore was unable to fit them into their 
understanding of the grain trade. Throughout 1972 the Western Producer, as well as other 
smaller newspapers, carried stories about the Soviet-American deal but these were usually 
relegated to the interior pages in favour of placing Canadian news stories on the front pages.  
More importantly, prior to the Soviet-American grain deals becoming public knowledge in the 
United States, the Western Producer had already run a story about the Soviets placing purchase 
offers for Canadian grain with the CWB.
110
  The Soviets had bought Canadian grain from the 
CWB in previous years and their purchases in 1972 were considered to be business as usual.  A 
story about Brazil wanting more wheat than in the past, for example, was cause for more interest 
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because it was unexpected.
111
  The Producer's coverage of the various CWB grain sales elicited 
little farmer comment because they considered it unremarkable and only used the information 
about increased sales to gauge what crops to plant that year. When the first sale between the 
Soviets and the American government became public, the Western Producer ran a story on why, 
according E.K. Turner, the sales would not hurt Canada.  It was a short article buried toward the 
middle of the paper indicating that the Producer's editors did not think it was an issue that 
concerned many farmers.
 112
  Even if a farmer was concerned that the massive sale would hurt 
Canada's chances of selling the Soviets more grain the articles in the next issues would have 
lessened any concerns.  The Producer reported "Soviet crop problems said to be worsening"
113
 
and followed this story up with one on how the Soviets would be purchasing more wheat and 
barley from Canada.
114
  There was never any suggestion in the articles or in the letters to the 
editors that the Soviet-American sales would prevent Canadian farmers from selling their grain 
or reduce Canadian grain prices. 
 After news of the Soviet deals with the private grain trade became known the only time 
that Canadian farm organizations took a public stance was when some of them, in conjunction 
with many American farm organizations, "criticized the last two International Grains 
Arrangements, saying the lack of effective price provisions has kept world wheat prices low 
since 1967...[and] farmers are not benefitting fully and fairly from the present record world grain 
sales....the lack of international co-operation is responsible for prices to farmers remaining at low 
levels, despite the present high export demand."
115
 This criticism fit much more closely with the 
point made by the Australian and Canadian Wheat Boards, as well as other exporting countries, 
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that the American government subsidies were depressing the world price yet this criticism was 
ignored.   
 Even before the news was made official, staff at the Canadian Wheat Board were already 
aware that the Soviets were going to be having lower than expected yields for their harvests.  As 
one former CWB staff member recalled, a USDA staffer would later ask how the CWB had 
acquired such good intelligence.
116
  The CWB operated what the Western Producer dubbed an 
"intelligence wing"
117
 where staff kept up-to-date on events in the exporting and importing 
countries and in turn passed this information to the rest of the Canadian Wheat Board’s staff.  
The credit for much of the CWB's knowledge of the Soviet's upcoming bad harvests lay with a 
woman who had been involved with the Ukrainian agriculture ministry before she had come to 
Canada and subsequently been hired by the Canadian Wheat Board.  Her experience allowed her 
to "read between the lines,"
118
 which in turn gave CWB negotiating teams a stronger position 
when the Soviets wanted to buy Canadian grain.
119
  In 1972, armed with the knowledge that the 
Soviets were facing a particularly low harvest, the CWB negotiators stretched sales out as long 
as they could because the international grain market set the grain prices which formed the base 
price from which the CWB was forced to negotiate with the Soviets.  Until the international 
market realized and reacted to the fact that the Soviets' poor harvest was going to result in a 
significant increase in demand for the 1972 crop, the CWB could not take much advantage of its 
knowledge.  They, therefore, made small sales to the Soviets so that each time the Soviets came 
back for more grain the price had risen.
120
  Once world grain prices began to climb sharply in the 
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summer of 1972, the Soviets were still buying from the CWB so Canadian farmers benefited 
from the Soviet-American deals becoming public.   The CWB's Annual Report 1972-1973 shows 
increased sales figures and revenue compared to previous years.
121
 As a staff member put it, 
Canadian farmers "did very well."
122
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Chapter Three 
The Great Grain Robbery Rides Again 
 
 Beginning in the early 1990s the concept of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) "stealing" 
grain and consequently farmers' rightful profits through underselling became a prominent part of 
the debate around the validity of the single-desk.  The "great grain robbery" was resurrected and 
given a new meaning to encompass the ideas of the anti-Board side of the debate.  Don Baron's 
1998 book Canada's Great Grain Robbery resonated within parts of the western Canadian 
agricultural community and helped to advance the resurrection and repurposing of the "great 
grain robbery" catch-phrase.  The book created a coherent narrative out of the various points 
made by the anti-Board side, and, with its title, provided a resonate and already popularized 
catch-phrase that could be used to summon up that narrative. Although the phrase referenced the 
1972 Soviet-American sales, they were only a small part of Baron's "great grain robbery". 
Instead, Baron saw the "great grain robbery" as a decades-long event that began with the 1901 
formation of the Territorial Grain Growers Association and continued into the 1990s.  The book 
claimed western farmers had been systematically prevented from selling and profiting from their 
own grain while at the same time Canada's agricultural system was failing farmers in a variety of 
ways, from a lack of market information to slow rail transport because of inherent problems 
within the design of the transportation system.  It was, Baron argued, the Canadian Wheat Board 
and its supporters who were the main cause of these problems.  Within the agricultural 
community opinion was divided on the book.  Anti-Board farmers saw the book as a vindication 
of everything they had been saying, while pro-Board farmers felt it was misleading at best and 
grossly inaccurate at worse.  For both sides, however, it helped to codify the points that the anti-
Board side of the farm community had been making vigorously throughout the 1990s.   
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  The revival of the term "great grain robbery" within the western Canadian agricultural 
community had its roots at the end of the 1980s, even though by the beginning of the 1980s the 
American-Soviet grain sales had already faded into a distant memory for most of the Canadian 
agricultural community.  For the majority of Canadian farmers, the sales had been close to a non-
event although they had reaped the high prices that had been created partly as a result of the 
Soviet's massive purchases depleting the world grain carryover stocks.  The campaigning by pro- 
open market groups, like the Palliser Wheat Growers Association (PWGA) and Western 
Canadian Barley Growers Association (WCBGA), to make Canada a fully private market, or so-
called open market, for grain was continuing but without particular note by the rest of the farm 
community. At the opening of the decade many farmers still considered them to be fringe groups 
with few members and such an extreme position that it was difficult to take them seriously.
1
  The 
PWGA and other like-minded organizations were undaunted and continued to advocate for the 
changes they wanted to see in the Canadian grain industry, including the end of the Crow's Nest 
Pass Freight Rate Agreement (the Crow). While there was considerable debate within the 
agricultural community over these and other issues, the Soviet sales were not cited as a historical 
example.   
 At the end of the 1980s there were two events which anti-Board groups took as a positive 
sign that Canada's grain industry could change in their favour and which encouraged them to 
become even more vocal in their opposition to the current system.  The first was the signing of 
the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.  Before the agreement there had been an unspoken 
rule that delivering large quantities of Canadian grain into the United States was bad form. After 
the Free Trade Agreement was signed, however, that unspoken restriction on grain delivery was 
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removed.  While it had been argued that the Americans would not take kindly to Canadian 
farmers delivering large quantities of grain into the American system and thereby driving down 
prices and clogging the American grain handling system, free trade made it sound as though the 
Americans had agreed to Canadians delivering into their system without any restrictions.  In 
reality, the Americans remained just as opposed to Canadian grain flooding their system after the 
1988 Agreement as they had before.  This fact did not stop groups like the PWGA and the 
WCBGA who argued for giving farmers greater access to the American market by removing the 
CWB and giving Canadian farmers what they saw as an open market. 
 The second sign occurred a year later, in 1989, when the open market became a reality 
for oat growers.  For the previous several years the Alberta Grain Commission (AGC) had been 
increasingly vocal about the need for oat growers to take advantage of so-called "pony oats."
2
  
Pony oats were high quality oats which were bought to feed race horses.  They were a niche 
market that was well supplied by only a handful of oat growers.  The AGC, however, pointed to 
the high-priced pony oats as an example of the CWB failing to get the optimum price for 
producers who were selling their oats through the CWB's oat pools.
3
  When Charles "Charlie" 
Mayer, the Conservative Minister of State for Grains and Oilseeds, removed oats from the 
CWB's mandate in 1989, it came as a shock to the agricultural community, particularly to pro-
Board farmers who had not expected the minister would truly take oats off the Board's mandate.
4
   
Canadian Wheat Board staff  had known that the removal of oats would happen and had been 
taking steps to try to minimize the problems it would cause for the CWB's oat pool.
5
 The 
removal of oats from the single-desk led to a surge in the supply of oats available for purchase.  
                                                 
2
 Alberta Grain Commission 25 Years 
3
 Interview with farmer, 16 September, 2009 (anonymous 5).; Interview with George Braithwaite, 27 August, 2009.; 
Interview with farmer, 15 October, 2009 (anonymous 4). 
4
 Interview with George Braithwaite, 27 August, 2009.; Interview with George Calvin, 21 July, 2009. 
5
 Interview with former CWB staff member, 13 April, 2010 (anonymous source 1). 
 52 
 
 
This sudden increase in supply was the result of many individual sellers trying to sell their oats at 
the same time, whereas before the CWB had been regulating the supply of Canadian oats that 
was available to the market.  Unsurprisingly, the price of oats promptly crashed and it remained 
low for several years.
6
  Nevertheless, the removal of oats from the Board was still seen as a 
victory for groups like the PWGA and the WBGA.
7
 It made these groups believe that the federal 
government was on their side when it came to changing Canadian agriculture and therefore they 
only needed to keep advocating for the changes they wanted to make them happen in short order. 
 The next major event which would be woven into the mythology surrounding the CWB 
occurred in 1993 when the Conservative government implemented the Continental Barley 
Market (CBM). The announcement from Conservative MP Charlie Mayer, then Minister of 
Agriculture, that the CBM would come into effect on 1 August 1993 was enthusiastically 
supported by anti-Board groups "includ[ing] the Western Barley Growers Association, the 
Alberta Cattle Commission, the Alberta Pulse Growers Commission and the Oat Producers 
Association of Alberta."
8
 Ralph Klein, who had just been recently elected Premier of Alberta, 
threw his government's support behind Mayer and the CBM, declaring that "[t]oo many rules and 
regulations hinder Alberta farmers` ability to compete in global markets."
9
 
 Pro-Board groups, however, were outraged by Mayer's decision.  Since more farmers 
grew barley than oats
10
 the outcry over the Continental Barley Market was considerable.  
Twenty-one agricultural organizations, including the Alberta Wheat Pool and Unifarm, released 
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a joint statement which called Mayer's implementation of the CBM through an order-in-council 
"an affront to the principles of open and consultative government, and to the very principle of 
democracy itself."
11
 It is interesting to note that groups like the Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg 
Marketing Agency and the Dairy Farmers of Canada were among the signatories, even though 
they did not deal directly with grain marketing because they had "common cause [in] the 
continuation of what they call orderly marketing systems."
12
 This joint statement echoed the 
sentiment from Wilf Harder, then head of the Wheat Board Advisory Committee, who was 
quoted as saying "I think [the CBM is] a real slam on the democratic system . . . Thousands of 
farmers in this country and every major producer organization in Canada told the minister not to 
do it. The minister did not listen. Instead, he turned his back on farmers. He abandoned farmers, 
the very people he is supposed to protect." 
13
 
 Part of the justification
14
 for the implementation of the CBM came from a study
15
 by 
University of California economist Colin Carter which concluded that farmers would realize a 
profit gain from the implementation of the CBM. To many opponents of the CBM, this study's 
credibility was suspect because the Carter study was commissioned by the Conservative 
government and its conclusions supported the government's ideological position.  The study's 
methodology and conclusions were not considered credible by many of the opponents of the 
CBM.  Charlie Swanson, president of Manitoba Pool, described the study as "overly 
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optimistic."
16
 More seriously, the study's creditability was attacked for its methodological 
approach.
17
 Carter also made basic mistakes such as claiming "[i]n cases where a government 
agency is in place (e.g., the CWB or the Japanese Food Agency - JFA), the private trade buys 
from the exporter (CWB) and sells to the importer (JFA). The two government agencies do not 
deal directly with one another. Exceptions are sales by the state-level Australian Barley Boards 
and the CWB to the FSU’s Exportkhleb and Ceroil Food Inc. in China."18 Since the CWB had in 
fact dealt directly with the JFA, Carter's claim only served to add more doubt about his study's 
conclusions about the benefits of the CBM.  It also suggested that "high elevation costs"
19
 were 
the result of "inefficiencies...associated with the monopoly system"
20
 even though this was also a 
problem outside of Canada in grain handling systems where single-desk marketing agencies do 
not operate.  Carter's paper also pointed out that "the CWB (1992) argued that profit 
opportunities would be lost under a continental market because producers would be unable to 
observe export prices and could end up selling to the U.S. when third-country exports through 
the CWB would be more profitable. The above point demonstrates that producers did not receive 
accurate market signals under the CWB monopoly system."
21
 While this observation may have 
been literally accurate Carter was projecting back the problems of a continental market onto 
CWB's single-desk to justify his conclusion that a CBM would be better. It also ignored the fact 
that all grain traders and buyers had a similar standard practice in that it was not in their 
economic self-interest to allow their competitors to know the prices at which they sold and 
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bought grain. In not making their sales information publicly available the CWB was conforming 
to the standard practice of the international grain market.  Farmers were just as unable to truly 
know the export prices set by private companies and government purchasing or marketing 
agencies until CWB final payments were issued.   
 Despite the problems with Carter's paper, anti-Board supporters found that it reinforced 
their beliefs about the Canadian Wheat Board's inability to get them the best price and that they 
would be better off selling their own grain in the international market. Colin Carter's work was 
part of what they relied on to explain why they did not support the Board.
22
  Carter's point about 
the lack of "accurate market signals under the CWB monopoly system"
23
 was combined with 
their idea that competition between farmers provided the best prices and product. The rationale 
was that if farmers were competing for customers with each other it would encourage them to 
grow the highest quality product to get the customers which would lead to the farmer with the 
highest quality grain getting the highest price.
24
  
 While the anti-Board people had the Carter study, the pro-Board people had a study
25
 
done by University of Saskatchewan economists Drs. Richard Gray and Alvin Ulrich, and 
University of California, at Berkeley, economist Dr. Andrew Schmitz which was commissioned 
by the three prairie pools. Naturally, the anti-Board side viewed this study as inaccurate although 
they could provide no detailed criticism of it. Gray and his colleagues concluded that "[t]he 
reduction in the prices received for malting and feed barley will result in reduced barley area and 
reduced revenues from barley produced in western Canada. The proposed CBM could easily 
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result in a loss [emphasis in original] of at least $12 million for the combined malting and feed 
barley markets."
26
 This finding was the opposite of Carter's conclusion that "net economic effects 
on farmers are estimated with [Canadian Regional Agricultural Model] to be increased annual 
grain revenues of about $52 million per year (allowing for crop substitution between barley and 
other crops.)"27 Ultimately the anti-Board side would not accept the conclusions of Gray et al, 
while the pro-Board side did not accept Carter's conclusions. 
 Shortly after Mayer announced his decision the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, which at the 
time had "more than 50,000 members"
28
 in the province, in conjunction with Alberta Wheat Pool 
and Manitoba Pool Elevators, "filed a statement of claim in a Regina court and [sought] an 
injunction to block the"
29
 order-in-council. It was, according their lawyer John Beke, "a last 
recourse."
30
  The Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench decided "the impugned regulations were 
validly made. On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan found the Saskatchewan Court 
of Queen's Bench did not have jurisdiction to decide this matter."
31
 From there, the case went to 
the Federal Court where on 10 September 1993 Justice Rothstein ruled that the order-in-council 
which created the CBM was "ultra vires and of no force and effect."
32
  This ruling ended the 
Continental Barley Market after just forty days.   
 When the Continental Barley Market had been officially announced the price of barley 
began falling quickly just as the price of oats had done when it had been removed from the Board 
in 1989. The premium that Canadian farmers were accustomed to receiving for their malt barley 
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also vanished with the implementation of the CBM and was not recovered until after the end of 
the CBM. During the time the CBM was in effect "over half the demand in the U.S. market had 
been met. U.S. feed barley prices did not recover until months later."
33
 The sharp decline in 
barley prices and the loss of the malt barley premium combined with their recovery after the end 
of the CBM was taken by pro-Board supporters as an excellent example of why the CWB 
provided farmers with better value than an open market possibly could.  Anti-Board groups were 
furious that the open market in barley had ended.  "It's not an example . . . there was hardly time 
to do anything before we lost it,"
34
 one farmer recalled bitterly.  They charged that forty days had 
not been long enough to use the Continental Barley Market as an example of what would happen 
to Canadian farmers on the open market. In the end the short-lived CBM cemented the schism 
within the agricultural community over the question of how best to market farmers’ grains.  
 In 1992, the year before the Continental Barley Market was put into place, John 
Channon, former head of the Alberta Grain Commission, gave a speech to the Western Barley 
Growers Association in which he explicitly stated the tropes — the CWB stealing from farmers, 
farmers having the true history of Canadian agriculture hidden from them, and farmers being 
prevented from having the marketing freedom they deserved —  that would come to make up the 
great grain robbery rhetoric of the anti-Board side of the farm community.  Channon claimed 
"millions of dollars were lost in what I call the first grain robbery . . . in September 1963 when a 
Soviet delegation arrived in Ottawa to buy wheat."
35
 The story that Channon told was his "own 
version"
36
 and careful examination of it reveals that it was designed to play up the partisan and 
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inaccurate historical revisionism that later pervaded anti-Board groups like the Barley Growers 
and Wheat Growers. 
 Channon claimed that it was illegal for the Soviets to deal with the Canadian Wheat 
Board until the two governments had signed a trade agreement.
37
 This claim ignored the fact that 
any business between the CWB and Exportkhelb
38
 was done through contracts, a procedure 
which did not require any trade agreement between the two governments.  Furthermore, the 
CWB had been successfully contracting grain sales with the Soviets since 1956.
39
  Channon's 
description of the Soviets requiring basic pricing procedures to be explained to them is 
historically inaccurate since by 1963 grains sales between Exportkhelb and the CWB were hardly 
a new experience for either side. The Soviets would not have required any hand-holding.   
 When the Soviets finally agreed to a contract, according to Channon, "Bill Mack 
[referring to CWB Chief Commissioner William "Bill" McNamara] rushed out of the meeting 
room in the Chateau Laurier holding his head and cursing himself for having been beaten in a 
trade . . . He had sold the lion's share of the crop at a fixed price when the price was low!"
40
 
Channon's assessment simply is not supported by any historical records including the Canadian 
Wheat Board's annual report for that year.
41
 The profitability of these sales for farmers was 
reflected "[i]n Saskatchewan farm implement sales [which] rose by 33 per cent" as well as sales 
of other farmer inputs.
42
  Secondly, by singling out the fixed price, Channon implied that 
McNamara should have used an alternative method even though the accepted practice for grains 
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sales was to contract for the sale of an agreed upon volume and grade of grain at a set price 
which both parties agreed to before signing a contract.   
 Channon then claimed that when the CWB realized that the sale to the Soviets had been 
made at too low a price, the Board offered their other buyers "the same opportunity of screwing 
the Western grain farmers," an action which was "agreed among the Board and the government 
officials."
43
  The idea that Wheat Board officials and the Pearson Liberal government were 
conspiring to prevent western farmers from realizing the profits they deserved is not supported 
by any evidence.  The implication of a conspiracy against farmers, however, played into the anti-
Board narrative of the western farmer being prevented from realizing the full amount of profit 
their grain should have received because of the meddling of both the CWB and Ottawa.  
Channon's story, although rife with inaccurate historical revisionism, supported the claims the 
anti-Board side had been making about the CWB preventing them from making the best profits 
possible.  Having a historical example to support their claims provided greater validity to their 
present-day claims.  Channon reinforced the message of his story by saying "we wuz robbed!"
44
 
By using that line to close his story in conjunction with his opening characterization of the events 
as "the first grain robbery"
45
  Channon purposefully crafted a narrative that explicitly played up 
the idea of the Canadian Wheat Board as an organization which steals the rightful profits of 
farmers. This narrative contained the most pervasive and simplest trope of the great grain 
robbery catch-phrase.   
 To add extra credibility to his tale, Channon portrayed himself as an insider with the 
implication that he was close enough to know the "true story" of what happened between the 
Soviets and the Canadian Wheat Board instead of the one farmers would have received through 
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the media.  By describing himself as "on the fringe of events there and then and from that 
vantage point [he] could watch the game in relaxed fascination"
46
 Channon implied his status as 
neutral third-party observer. He was careful to set himself apart from the government officials 
and the Wheat Board so that he did not become party to the robbery he was recounting.  While 
he may have been in Ottawa, like the agents for several major grain companies were once it was 
realized that the Soviets were buying grain instead of selling,
47
 it is highly unlikely that Channon 
would have had any special knowledge of the negotiations with the Soviets since he was not a 
staff member of the Canadian Wheat Board or Exportkhelb. Since grain prices are heavily 
influenced by information about the situations of the buyers and sellers, it would have been 
routine practice for negotiations between Leonid Matveev, the director of Exportkhelb, and 
McNamara and other Wheat Board staff to be kept completely confidential.  Channon's admitted 
that "I was never in the room, although never far away"
48
 which means he was not in a position 
to have any insider knowledge.  By using the phrasing he did, Channon implied that he was in a 
position to reveal  the secret historical truths about the events. 
 Channon's speech was delivered to the annual convention of the Western Barley 
Growers, an anti-Board group whose members would have been highly receptive to the ideas 
contained within Channon's speech. His statements not only validated the Barley Growers' stance 
on the CWB, but also provided historical precedent to support the validity of their stance.  It is 
interesting to note that Channon closed his story by saying "It is a moot point as to whether or 
not an open market in Canada [i.e. a market without the single-desk CWB] would have resulted 
in a much higher price in 1963. Personally I believe that it would, mostly because there are no 
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secrets among the Winnipeg grain fraternity."
 49
  The implication that there was perfect 
transparency between grain traders is illogical since the traders make their profits by having 
better knowledge of the market and future conditions, such as expected harvest size and 
condition, than their competitors. As the 1972 grain sales to the Soviets demonstrated secrecy is 
one of the most important and routine practices in the grain trade. It is not reasonable to imply 
that grain traders in Winnipeg do not use the same standards when they must work in the same 
international grain market as other traders.  In contrasting the openness of the grain traders with 
the secrecy of the Wheat Board, Channon gave a highly unrealistic description of the grain trade.  
It was a description, however, which his audience would have supported.  As a perceived insider 
Channon's comments validated the audience's own ideas about the grain trade. Ultimately, 
Channon's speech traded accuracy for ideology. 
 Between 1994 and the 1998 publication of Don Baron's book Canada's Great Grain 
Robbery the polarization of the western Canadian agricultural between pro- and anti-Board 
factions intensified.  During this time the Canadian Wheat Board, partly as a result of Canada's 
agreement to NAFTA, was investigated on three separate occasions
50
 on the suspicion that it was 
selling Canadian grain below market price and thereby giving Canadian farmers an unfair trade 
advantage over their American counterparts.  None of these investigations concluded that the 
CWB was underselling,
51
 a fact which pro-Board supporters would use to support their position 
while anti-Board supporters either ignored the conclusions of the various investigations or 
charged that they had not been using the right method for investigating the CWB.  
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 Another common argument made by the anti-Board side was that farming had changed 
significantly since the 1930s when farmers had campaigned for the Wheat Board to be enacted 
so even if the CWB may have been useful in the past, it no longer served a useful function for 
farmers who were working in the current grain marketing environment.  With the advent of 
telephones and faxes farmers had, they argued, the ability to access up-to-date market 
information and to conduct one on one business transactions with potential buyers unlike farmers 
in previous decades. Once internet access became common the anti-Board found this argument 
even more compelling since information could be found faster than with previous methods. The 
anti-Board side viewed the ability to utilize technology along with increasing farm size
52
 as 
indicators that farmers were treating their farming operations as a business. To the anti-Board 
side the farmer-business owner knew their crops better than anyone else, including the CWB, 
ever could so they were the best person to market their own crops and to move quickly to take 
advantage of or develop new markets when they had the opportunity.  The CWB and the 
requirements of the Producer Direct Sales Program (PDS) made it so that they could not achieve 
their full potential as farmer-business owners. Some anti-Board people therefore began to grow 
off-Board crops which could be sold into high value niche markets.
53
 When the returns for the 
niche markets were compared to the returns for CWB grains, the niche market returns tended to 
be equal to or higher than the CWB grains which some anti-Board people saw as a sign that the 
CWB was not doing a good job marketing farmers’ grain.  This view, however, did not take into 
account the fact that the market for a niche crop like borage or canary seed was different in many 
ways, including the number of sellers and end use of the product, than the market that the CWB 
was selling into for barley and wheat. Regardless, the anti-Board side used the way niche crop 
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marketing worked as an example of what would happen if farmers could market their barley and 
wheat without the Canadian Wheat Board.  
Pro-Board farmers argued that it was unrealistic to think that farmers could compete with 
multinational companies just because farmers could use technology since that technology was 
also used by the companies.  They pointed out that the companies had multiple staff members 
whose full time jobs focused on selling and trading grain, whereas, a farmer would find it 
difficult, if not impossible, to do the same level of work as an individual. The companies had 
more money and therefore more time and resources to devote to their grain trading than any 
individual farmer.  The CWB helped to lessen the imbalance of power between farmers and 
companies in the international grain market.  Pro-Board farmers viewed the CWB as a way to 
have “a level playing field.”54  Anti-Board farmers saw the idea of the CWB as being an 
equalizer for farmers as negative since they believed it did not encourage farmers to work their 
hardest and give them incentives to produce the best possible crop. It was, therefore, critical to 
anti-Board farmers that they received freedom from the Wheat Board. From their perspective 
better prices and stronger competition would result with the removal of the CWB but having 
these points happen were secondary concerns for them since their primary goal was to get 
“marketing freedom” by removing the Wheat Board.55 
 On 14 February 1995 Conservative Ron Hierath, MLA for Taber-Warner, introduced the 
following motion in the Alberta legislature: 
 
Be it resolved that the Legislative Assembly request the government to request the 
federal government to amend the Canadian Wheat Board Act so that producers of 
wheat and barley will have the option to market their grain on the North American 
continent either through the Canadian Wheat Board or by private export and that 
                                                 
54
 Interview with farmer, 15 October, 2009 (anonymous 4). 
55
 Interview with Brian Otto 4 September, 2009.; Interview with Carol Husband, 3 September, 2009.; Interview with 
Buck Spencer, 6 September, 2009. 
 64 
 
 
this option be extended by November 1, 1995. If the aforementioned time line is 
not met, the government of Alberta is urged to conduct a provincewide [sic] 
plebiscite for the producers of wheat and barley.
56
 
 
The motion was a way for the Alberta government to continue its opposition to the CWB and to, 
theoretically, have Alberta farmers show that they were supportive of their provincial 
government's stance. Having Hierath introduce the motion distanced the government from the 
initiative since Hierath was not a cabinet member which helped to make the provincial 
government look more impartial.  Secondly, Hierath's background as a farmer, including his 
previous involvement with the Alberta Grain Commission, Western Barley Growers Association, 
and the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association, provided a sense of legitimacy to the 
motion.
57
   This motion was successfully passed and the Alberta government held the plebiscite 
that year through a mail-in ballot. Alberta Barley Commission Chairman Tim Harvie was "elated 
by the Minister's announcement . . . after having our rights to market our own grain removed 
from us for over 50 years, we are now going to be given a chance, as Alberta farmers, to vote on 
this issue."
58
  The requirements for eligibility were that the voter be "18 years of age or older, 
[have] grown barley and/or wheat in one or more of the last three crop years, and [have] a 
financial interest in the crops."
59
 It would become infamous in the farm community for returning 
more votes than there were farmers eligible to vote.
60
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 The questions on the plebiscite were "Are you in favor of having the freedom to sell your 
barley to any buyer, including the Canadian Wheat Board, into domestic and export markets?"
61
 
and "Are you in favor of having the freedom to sell your wheat to any buyer, including the 
Canadian Wheat Board, into domestic and export markets?"
62
 The questions used the freedom 
rhetoric that had become increasingly prevalent since the Mulroney government's illegal attempt 
to establish the Continental Barley Market in 1993. They also incorrectly described the CWB as 
a buyer of farmers' grain which implied that it functioned exactly like a private company.  In 
fact, the CWB acted as the sales agent for farmers and did not buy then resell their grain as the 
question and many anti-Board people claimed.  The CWB functioned as a marketing agent and 
seller for western Canadian farmers, a function which put it in a different position than the 
private traders both in relation to farmers and to the industrial scale buyers in the world market.  
Additionally, the questions reinforced the idea that a dual market was possible by implying that 
there would be no changes should the CWB become voluntary.   
 Since the Alberta government was handling the plebiscite, pro-Board farmers were 
worried that it would use a leading question.
63
 This fear was confirmed as soon as the question 
was made public. Many farmers pointed out that the questions used leading language to secure a 
vote in favor of the dual market approach.  The Alberta Barley Commission disliked the criticism 
of the question, complaining that "the Canadian Wheat Board, the Advisory Committee to the 
Board, the National Farmers Union, and Unifarm concentrated their remarks on unwarranted 
attacks on the question, the process, and/or the organizations who have tried to represent the 
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views of the majority of Alberta farmers."
64
  Heirath later replied to the critics of the wording of 
the question saying, "I know the other side will say it was slanted, and in some respects it 
was...But the truth of the matter is it was a direct question and I don't know how else you word it.  
It was absolutely clear in my mind."
65
   
 Later that fall, Minister of Agriculture Walter Paszkowski was asked in the legislature if 
"Alberta government [was] promoting one side or the other."
66
 He replied "Absolutely not, Mr. 
Speaker. I've said time and again that the matter is a grassroots producers' issue and one the 
grassroots producers should indeed indulge in discussions about."
67
 Even though it was 
publically known to be tied to the Alberta government, the Alberta Barley Commission worked 
hard to promote the "yes" vote on the plebiscite as did groups like the Western Canadian Wheat 
Growers, which it would emerge had received funding from the Alberta government.
68
  The 
Alberta Barley Commission worked with three other farm groups
69
 to hold a telemarketing 
campaign about the plebiscite as well as print advertising.
70
  The telephone script for the 
campaign told farmers that "[f]or over 50 years, only farmers on the Prairies have been denied 
the right to market their own barley or wheat, except for domestic feed."
71
 
 The ABC was working with the Western Barley Growers Association, Western Canadian 
Wheat Growers Association, and Alberta Winter Wheat Producers Commission to do the 
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campaigns for the plebiscite although this information was not officially provided until the 
Winter 1995 issue of Barley Country was mailed to Alberta grain producers after the plebiscite 
had been held.
72
  Pro-Board farmers were so concerned by the Alberta Barley Commission's 
campaign leading up to the plebiscite that they donated money to a campaign aimed at 
countering the anti-Board campaigning.  In total "about $10,000 was donated by farmers to fund 
the pro-Board campaign."
73
  The ABC declined to mention how much it had spent on the 
campaign though given the combination of telemarketing, print advertisement, and other 
activities,
74
 the total cost to ABC was likely more than the amount spent by the pro-Board 
campaign.
75
  
 The results of the plebiscite were 66 percent in favour of the question for barley and 62 
percent for wheat. A total of 16,023 ballots were cast.  It is important to note that because of the 
way the question was worded the voters who voted in favour were not actually voting to 
completely get rid of the CWB but rather to have the so-called dual market option with a 
voluntary CWB as one of the many potential buyers for the farmer's product. Pro-Board groups 
immediately called into question the results because of the leading question and whether the 
voters had really understood the full implications and potential problems of the dual-market 
concept. The integrity of the voters' list was also highly suspect. The CWB Advisory Committee 
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suggested that "conservative estimates put the voters' list at around 50,000 people"
76
 while 
Alberta Agriculture's website claimed only 15,586 farmers.
77
  There was also speculation about 
how the advertising of groups like the ABC had affected the results.  The Barley Commission 
claimed that any criticism directed at it, and by extension the plebiscite, was "for daring to speak 
out against the tyranny of this system [the CWB]."
78
 
 A new anti-Board group, the Farmers for Justice (FFJ), was formed in 1995 in reaction to 
Canada Customs charging farmers who hauled their grain over the Canada-US border without an 
export permit. The group drew membership from older anti-Board organizations like WCWGA 
and the WBGA.  Rick Strankman, a member of the FFJ, described it as "the Viet Cong of farm 
organizations."79 The FFJ promoted the idea that Canadian farmers were a minority oppressed by 
CWB and coordinated protests against the Canadian Wheat Board. The Farmers For Justice 
focused their activities mainly on the charges and resulting court cases against farmers who had 
driven grain across the Canada-US border as a protest against the Canadian Wheat Board. Export 
permits were issued by the Canadian Wheat Board which FFJ members interpreted to mean that 
they could not sell their grain by themselves. They also charged that the Wheat Board refused to 
issue licenses to farmers who spoke out against the single-desk.
80
 This claim supported the idea 
that if FFJ members did not have export permits it was because they knew that they would not 
get them from the Wheat Board even if they applied since the Wheat Board was punishing them 
for advocating for the end of the single-desk and the beginning of farmers' freedom.   
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 In the spring of 1996 the FFJ staged a second border-running in Alberta with a smaller 
group of farmers.  This time, in addition to being charged with exporting without a license, the 
farmers were also charged with a failure to comply with the Customs Act because they illegally 
removed their vehicles after the vehicles had been seized and impounded by Canada Customs.
81
  
Although the WBGA did not officially condone the border running or breaking laws, Buck 
Spencer, president of the Western Barley Growers Association, said publicly that "If I can't stop 
them, I'm going to help them get in the least trouble as possible."
82
 The FFJ members were 
extremely frustrated by the single-desk and what they perceived as the unwillingness of the 
Wheat Board and then federal Liberal Minister of Agriculture Ralph Goodale to make any 
changes to the status quo. They wanted to "do something that would get attention"
83
 so that 
Canadians outside the farm community would become aware of their concerns.  Spencer warned 
that "he [would hold] federal minister of agriculture Ralph Goodale responsible if anything 
[went] wrong."
84
  Ron Duffy, one of the farmers who was charged with breaking the Customs 
Act during a border crossing in April 22, 1996, characterized his actions and those of his fellow 
border-runners as "fighting for our basic rights and freedoms. What the government is doing is 
unjust, illegal, immoral and unethical."
85
 
 Andrew McMechan, a Manitoba farmer, became one of the most well-known members of 
the FFJ because he was convicted, fined, and jailed from July to December 1996 for failing to 
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surrender his vehicle,
86
 breaking the Immigration Act, the Customs Act, and the Criminal 
Code.
87
 During his incarceration the FFJ attempted to get "Amnesty International to declare him 
a political prisoner."
88
  Amnesty International never did make any public statements regarding 
McMechan's case in particular or the FFJ's cause in general. During his trial for charges 
stemming from the 13 March border-running protest, Judge B.D. Giesbrecht directly addressed 
the appeal to Amnesty International as well as the idea of McMechan being a freedom fighter 
against an unjust system:  
Mr. McMechan is in jail because he has broken the law.  He insists that he will 
continue to break the law until he gets his way.  The Justice department is forced 
to prosecute. There has been some suggestion that there is precedent for Mr. 
McMechan's behavior along the lines of civil disobedience initiated by the likes 
of Mahatma Ghandi, Martin Luther King or Nelson Mandela.  There has even 
been an appeal to Amnesty International.  But that is patent nonsense. Ghandi, 
King and Mandela were fighting against unjust oppression and racism.  Andy 
McMechan is not in this category.  To liken a grain marketing arrangement put in 
place at the request of a majority of farmers to a system of apartheid or 
government sanctioned segregation is an insult to the Mandelas of this world and 
trivialized the nobility of their struggles.
89
 
 
This judgement did not dissuade anti-Board supporters who continued to hold McMechan up as a 
victim of the Wheat Board.
90
 
 At the same time the border-running was taking place the Western Grain Marketing Panel 
(WGMP) was holding hearings on the prairies.  The panel had been stuck by Federal Minister of 
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Agriculture Ralph Goodale
91
 on July 17, 1995 and was to report its findings by June 1996.
92
 The 
Western Grain Marketing Panel was mandated to: 
enhance the level of accurate information and common understanding about all 
aspects of the marketing of western Canadian grains, oilseeds and specialty crops. 
and further to provide a vehicle for fact-based, prairie-wide discussions and 
analyses of marketing issues, including the nature and requirements of existing 
and potential markets, the commodities and products that are sold or could be sold 
into such markets, the marketing systems that are now available or could be 
available to exploit such markets to the maximum possible benefits for western 
producers.
93
 
 
As part of its response to fulfilling its mandate the Panel heard directly from farmers at public 
meetings held across the three prairie provinces as well as reviewing written submissions. The 
anti-Board side was suspicious of the WGMP because it had been called by a Liberal Agriculture 
Minister who, they felt, had not taken the Alberta wheat and barley marketing plebiscite 
seriously while the pro-Board side worried about the panel's reliability because members like 
Jack Gorr were known for being anti-Board.  Many pro-Board farmers felt the FFJ and their 
border-running was designed to influence the findings of the panel.  
 The story of the individual farmers courageously taking on the giant Canadian Wheat 
Board in order to get the freedom to market their own grain while going so far as to risk jail time 
was heavily reported in the farm press.  It was also well reported in more mainstream 
newspapers like the Calgary Herald, Edmonton Journal¸ and Saskatoon Star-Phoenix.  The up 
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swell of coverage led one letter-writer to the Producer to note that "[t]he last time the anti-CWB 
forces got this much attention was just before they were badly beaten in the 1994 CWB advisory 
committee elections! One certainly would not have predicted such an outcome if they had used 
the amount of media coverage as their outcome indicator."
94
 It was also suspected that the 
border-running was being done to push the federal government to act quickly to make changes to 
the Canadian Wheat Board that the anti-Board FFJ and similar groups wanted to see.  Minister 
Goodale warned that "[r]unning the border will not stampede me or the government of Canada 
into making foolish decision."
95
 
  Many farmers were worried that the WGMP was merely for show so that the 
government could appear to be listening to their concerns while remaining with the status quo 
after the WGMP had reported its findings.  Even so, many farmers attended the public meetings 
and gave presentations to the Western Grain Marketing Panel. In one memorable instance, 
Alberta farmer and anti-Wheat Board activist Tom Jackson announced at the end of his 
presentation that he would be going on a hunger strike. Jackson felt that doing so was the only 
way to get across how truly frustrated he had become with the current single-desk system and to 
get the Minister of Agriculture to pay attention.
96
  Jackson told the panel, "[w]e farmers are 
slaves of the Canadian Wheat Board and I take it [the issue] that seriously."
97
  
 The main purpose of Jackson's hunger strike was to bring attention to the way the export 
license Producer Direct Sales Program was handled since he felt that farmers should not have to 
pay for the license.
98
 The buy-back system
99
 was where a farmer could bypass the Wheat Board's 
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pools to sell their grain directly to a buyer.  The buy-back was essentially a paper transaction 
where farmers would buy their grain out of the pool (the buy-back from the CWB) and then sell 
their grain to the buyer. It was primarily used for farmers who wanted to sell directly into the 
American market.  Therefore, the price for the buy-back was set daily at the price the CWB was 
getting for grain that day.  Due to the initial, interim, and final payment system the Board used 
for pooled grain, the daily buy-back price was usually higher than the initial payment price. Anti-
Board farmers did not understand that the initial payment price was not the full price they would 
get for their grain in the pool and instead viewed the initial payment as the only payment and felt 
they were missing the higher American prices.
100
  For pooled grain, however, the initial price 
was supplemented by interim and final payments for the year so that the total price the Canadian 
farmers got was usually equal to or better than the American prices since the Board was selling 
into the international  market which included America.  Farmers believed that they should not 
have to pay the cost of the buy-back since it prevented them from selling their own grain even 
though they would, in theory, receive greater than the buy-back price and so have a net cost of 
zero for the buy-back.
101
  The problem with the buy-back was that it was unusual for a farmer to 
find a sale which was greater than the price the Board was already getting.  Once the cost of 
transporting the grain to the buyer was factored into the costs of doing a buy-back, it made it 
even more difficult to break even on a sale. While there was nothing legally stopping a farmer 
from doing a Producer Direct Sale on which they would lose money, the majority of farmers 
preferred not to and instead  put their grain in the Board's pools. It should also be noted that from 
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the time of the Producer Direct Sale, the PDS farmer also received any interim and final CWB 
payments. 
 During his hunger strike, Tom Jackson drove to the Coutts border crossing, then went to 
Ralph Goodale's Regina constituency office to protest outside, before finally parking his grain 
truck in the loading dock of the Wheat Board building in Winnipeg.
102
 He wanted to make sure 
the Wheat Board would notice him and going to their building seemed like the best way.
103
 The 
hunger strike ended after thirty-four days since Jackson felt that he had made his point even 
though no changes had been made to the buy-back.
104
  
 When the Western Grain Marketing Panel finally released its report neither side was 
pleased.  For the anti-Board side, the report's recommendations did not go far enough in 
recommending the complete removal of the single-desk. Anti-Board campaigners vowed that the 
border-running would continue as would the protests over the Wheat Board.  As one farmer put 
it, "I guess [Agriculture Minister Ralph] Goodale's going to have to get some kind of 
concentration camp to keep us in lock-up. He'll have all of us by spring.''
105
  At the same time, 
the pro-Board side was just as unhappy with the WGMP's report and its recommendations.  For 
the pro-Board side the WGMP's most alarming recommendation was that "[f]eed barley should 
be placed under an open market system, not precluding the CWB"
106
 because it seemed like it 
was the set-up to the first step in completely removing the single-desk.  
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 As a follow-up to the Western Grain Marketing Panel report, Goodale announced that a 
plebiscite would be conducted among prairie grain farmers. The question for the plebiscite would 
ask farmers if they wanted to keep the current system or completely remove barley marketing 
from the Canadian Wheat Board's single-desk.  Since this plebiscite asked an essentially yes-or-
no question instead of the dual market idea raised in the question asked by the Alberta plebiscite, 
the results would provide a more definitive idea of what farmers wanted to happen with the 
CWB.  The all-or-nothing nature of the question did not please some anti-Board farmers because 
it cut out the dual-market option which they often touted as the compromise position between the 
single-desk and the private market even though the nature of the single-desk made a dual market 
option unfeasible. Secondly, it was the dual market option that helped to push the vote in favour 
of the anti-Board faction for the Alberta plebiscite.
107
 Glenn Sawyer of Acme, Alta wrote, "If 
Ralph Goodale and his department genuinely wish to determine the will of farmers on this issue, 
they must include a dual marketing choice for barley on the ballot."
108
 The Alberta Barley 
Commission dismissed it as "another Goodale charade"
109
 since by not including the dual market 
option the plebiscite "crafted a vote that appeal[ed] to few farmers and ignored the majority."
110
 
The ABC advised Alberta barley farmers to spoil their ballot by either marking both options or 
adding a "voluntary option" to mark; not returning their ballot; or sending the ballot provided in 
the ABC's Barley Country paper which had a dual market option.
111
 The Alberta government 
continued to support the anti-Board side by "hir[ing] a consulting firm to prepare arguments in 
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favor of dual marketing."
112
 Premier Ralph Klein expected that his government "would be quite 
prominent"
113
 in the campaign around the federal plebiscite.  
 The already highly polarized debate around the Wheat Board became even more divided 
during the federal barley plebiscite campaign.  The Farmers for Justice began to organize another 
border-running protest which was to be the "the mother of all convoys."114  Organizers were 
planning to sign up between 500 and 600 people to participate in the convey115 which was named 
the Andy 500 in honour of Andy McMechan.
116
 According to Jim Pallister, who was a director 
of the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association as well as a member of the FFJ, it was 
hoped the protest would be a "Berlin Wall-type of situation -- that many people were willing to 
defy that tyranny, and it was over."
117
 Even though public meetings were being held to plan the 
Andy 500 and the meetings' organizers insisted they were not intended to influence the federal 
plebiscite. They made it clear, however, they were not planning to do the protest until after the 
federal plebiscite and that the results from it would not influence what would happen to their 
planned border-running protest.
118
  
 Enthusiasm for the Andy 500 began to dampen when Dan Creighton and Gerald Blerot, 
both members of the Farmers for Justice who had been acting on behalf of Manitoba farmers 
who had been charged under the Customs Act, were "permanently banned from acting as legal 
counsel"
119
 by the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench. Part of the evidence brought forward was 
that Creighton had been told by a Judge that "if he proceeded with the argument he was making, 
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the judge would increase the amount of restitution the client would have to pay. [Creighton] 
persisted, and the client had to pay an additional $2,000."
120
 Even though the Farmers for Justice 
stuck by Creighton's suggestion that the order was actually "an attempt to take away the rights of 
accused people"
121
 the idea that there would be serious consequences to border-running was 
slowly beginning to permeate in the farm community. Farmers were becoming less enthused 
with the idea of getting stuck with expensive fines and a permanent record.  It was becoming 
clear that the court system would only hear about the Wheat Board in terms of export permits 
and related issues that were directly pertinent to the border-running charges. The courts would 
not allow the border-running charges to be used as a venue to discuss the ideological legitimacy 
of the CWB's single-desk and the courts would not rule on the legality of the CWB and the 
single-desk.
122
 By June the Andy 500 had been decreased to only "one or two trucks run the 
border but with as many as 1,000 people watching."
123
 By the end of the summer it had been 
cancelled partly as a result of seven Saskatchewan farmers being found guilty of breaking 
various parts of the Customs Act from their border-running protest.
124 
 At the same time the initial organization of the Andy 500 was taking place, columnist 
John Schmidt, known for his warnings of Communism in the 1970s, published a column 
attacking the Wheat Board for having a department which monitored weather and crop 
conditions partly by using satellites.  Schmidt called it a "surveillance department"
125
 and 
wondered if perhaps the collected data through permit book applications was being crosschecked 
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with satellite surveillance so it could be used to catch income tax cheats.
126
 "Yep, some of those 
fast-moving "stars" in the skies at night are not Santa Claus and his reindeer but man-made 
satellites watching you!" he told readers.
127
 Schmidt's column did make some people worried 
that the Wheat Board was watching them because of their support and involvement with anti-
Board groups like the FFJ and WCWG. The idea of Wheat Board surveillance on farmers 
seemed plausible to them given their already negative opinion of the Wheat Board.
128
 Pro-Board 
farmers at first "didn't believe they [the claimants] were serious"
129
 when they heard claims of 
the Wheat Board's surveillance satellites, but soon found that they had to explain weather and 
remote sensing satellites and how permit book applications worked when debating the Wheat 
Board issue.
130
 
 The Canadian Wheat Board released the report The CWB and Barley Marketing by Drs. 
Andrew Schmitz, Richard Gray, Troy Schmitz, and Gary Storey in January 1997.  The anti-
Board side viewed this study as the Wheat Board attempting to sway the vote while the pro-
Board side welcomed the report as more material to support their position for the continuation of 
the Wheat Board. The report found that between 1985 and 1995 "the CWB earned an additional 
average return of $72 million annually over the multiple-seller scenario."
131
 The Alberta Barley 
Commission immediately called the report's validity into question because it used confidential 
data which the Wheat Board would not release publicly. There was a long-standing contention 
among anti-Board farmers that the Wheat Board kept secret accounts which were used to hide 
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how it was stealing money that rightfully belonged to farmers.
132
 The ABC used this belief to 
support its claim that because the data was confidential the Wheat Board was hiding something 
and the authors of the report were wrong.
133
  The ABC also provided graphs comparing the 
CWB price with the price at Great Falls, Montana to show that the CWB did not achieve better 
prices. The graphs, however, used an American spot price compared to the CWB pooled price, 
which led to the same problems with accuracy that early comparisons using the same method 
also had.
 134
 As with the 1993 studies, The CWB and Barley Marketing became the subject of 
constant disagreement between the pro- and anti-Board sides of the debate. 
 J. O. Wright, a supporter of the Wheat Board, wrote in a letter to the Producer, "It seems 
to me that only an overwhelming vote in favor of keeping export barley with the Board will 
silence those bent on weakening and destroying this sales agency."
135
 When the results of the 
plebiscite were counted 62.9% had voted to keep the Wheat Board.  The vote did not satisfy the 
anti-Board side which vowed that it would continue working to completely remove the CWB. 
Pro-Board farmers were still determined to counter the efforts of the anti-Board side. 
 It was into this highly polarized environment that Canada's Great Grain Robbery was 
published in 1998. Written in an engagingly breezy informal style it appeared to those unfamiliar 
with the overall body of literature to be the first book to provide an apparently complete history 
of western prairie grain farming.  Unlike other books about prairie grain farming, like CF 
Wilson’s A Century of Canadian Grain, Baron’s book was not dauntingly long. The front cover 
proclaimed that Baron was a “prairie historian”136 which immediately lent the book an air of 
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credibility. Additionally, both the pro- and anti-Board sides of the farm community used 
historical facts to support their positions.
137
 The prairie farm community had a long tradition of 
respect for knowledge and scholarship, a position which Baron as a “historian” exploited.  
 Baron’s book posited that the prairie farmers had been led astray from early 1900s by the 
social gospel movement and left-wing philosophies.  Harkening back to the Communist-
baiting
138
 that had long been a staple of the Alberta political scene, Baron’s book implied that the 
social gospelers had been twisted into communists and this perversion is what had led them to 
begin agitating for the organization of cooperatives. The farm community of the early 1900s, 
according to Baron, had been misled by overly zealous preachers like Salem Bland, all of whom 
"were oblivious to one vital truth - competition and the free market are the very basis for wealth 
production and personal freedom."
139
 The Wheat Board, which came out of social gospel ideals, 
was simply the most obvious example of how the farmers had lost the "free market" and with it 
their freedom. Baron chronicled the way social gospel ideals and communist sympathies in the 
farm movement brought about the Wheat Board even though there had always been a few people 
who tried to show that doing so would not benefit farmers.  For anti-Board readers, Baron's ideas 
fit into their own mythology of the Wheat Board stealing their grain and preventing them from 
selling directly to buyers. Their long standing struggle against the Wheat Board was about to turn 
in favour of the anti-Board side because, according to Baron, the truth about the social gospel 
was finally exposed and "the growers' demands for freedom can no longer be denied."
140
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 Baron portrayed the formation of the cooperatives and the Wheat Board as a secret 
history that had been hidden by the cooperative movement and the communist social gospelers.  
The true exploitation of prairie farmers was being done not by the traders and grain handlers, as 
the conventional narrative would have had the farmers believe, but by the Wheat Board and the 
prairie pools.  It was these institutions, Baron charged, that were behind the real robbery of the 
prairie because they were preventing farmers from taking their true place in the grain trade.  
Leaving the marketing to the Wheat Board was a recipe for disaster since no farmer could ever 
trust the Board to truly get the best prices, let alone pass the full value back to farmers.  Baron 
conveniently forgot to address the fact that the Wheat Board had always put out an 
independently audited statement.  
 For Baron, the Great Grain Robbery was the fact that the Canadian Wheat Board existed.  
Farmers had been denied the true value of their crop since they had been forced to use the Wheat 
Board through legislation.  The second part of the robbery was that the farm organizations and 
the Wheat Pools were involved in left-wing politics
141
 instead of focusing solely on selling 
grain.
142
 Baron argued that any political action to support the current Canadian grain system only 
perpetuated the original failure of the social gospel by continuing to keep freedom away from 
farmers. Baron provided a brief overview of the history of the grain industry in Western Canada 
using it to show how the ideals of the "free market" had been corrupted and ignored.  The history 
also provided multiple examples of Canadian farmers losing money because of incompetence by 
the Wheat Board, government meddling, or a combination of both. The 1972 Soviet-American 
sales were only one example of how terribly Canadian farmers were losing out because of the 
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Wheat Board. Baron asserted that the Wheat Board did not realize what was happening in the 
international market until it was too late to take advantage of it.
143
 
 Baron's book was highly debated within the farm community. Opinion was divided on it.  
Anti-Board farmers saw the book as a vindication of everything they had been saying, while pro-
Board farmers felt it was misleading at best and grossly inaccurate at worse.  For both sides, 
however, it helped to codify the points that the anti-Board side of the farm community had been 
making vigorously throughout the 1990s.  Officials at the Canadian Wheat Board were also 
aware of the book although they did not see any value in engaging in the debate about it.
144
  For 
some farmers, Canada's Great Grain Robbery was the first book they had read about the history 
of the Canadian grain trade which made it "a real eye opener."
145
  These farmers were presented 
with what appeared to be a plausible account of the Canadian grain trade.  The book dealt with 
the 1993 Continental Barley Market events in which many farmers had been personally involved.  
Baron used the Carter-Lyons study heavily to show how the Wheat Board failed farmers and the 
Continental Barley Market had been wildly successful.
146
  The strongest evidence for this 
success, Baron provided, was that "barley exports surged to over half a million tonnes. Yet the 
Board had never sold more than 240,821 tonnes of feed barley to the US in a year."
147
  This 
increased barley export tonnage was an apparently impressive statistic. It did not, however, take 
into account the corresponding price drop created by such a large influx of grain into the limited 
American market. Framing the Continental barley market as a success because of increased 
                                                 
143
 Baron, 138-140. 
144
 Interview with former CWB staff member, 13 April, 2010 (anonymous source 2).; Interview with former CWB 
staff member, 28 October, 2009 (anonymous source 3). 
145
 Interview with Brian Otto 4 September, 2009. 
146
 Baron, 160-163. 
147
 Ibid., 163. 
 83 
 
 
export quantity was the same argument that the anti-Board side had been using since the CBM 
ended in 1993.  
 The similarity between Baron and the ideas of the anti-Board side helped to give those 
ideas credibility since, as a "prairie historian," Baron was seen as an authority on the subject. For 
readers unfamiliar with the history of the Canadian grain trade the similarities between Baron 
and the anti-Board side made Baron's arguments familiar which in turn made it easier to believe 
them. Since the primary audience for the book was farmers who were already predisposed to 
want support for their anti-Board stance, Baron's book was an extremely popular source of 
validation. By laying the history of the Canadian grain trade out in chronological order Baron 
provided his readers with the appearance of a long standing process to prevent farmers from 
gaining true freedom.  He also used a large number of quotes from former United Grain Growers 
Limited (UGG) president Mac Runciman to support his arguments which gave the implication 
that Runciman was an unbiased authority on the grain trade who was only interested in getting 
farmers the maximum price possible.  Canada's Great Grain Robbery contained the major 
themes of the anti-Board movement but put them within an inaccurate and revisionist historical 
context. Canadian agricultural historian John Thompson points out that the Wheat Board was 
not, as Baron suggests, “a communist plot to enslave Prairie grain farmers” 148 but instead 
actively and wholeheartedly supported by western farmers.  He describes Baron’s book as an 
“absurd polemic”149 and the use of ideas perpetuated by it as a "deliberate falsification of the 
historical record in the service of an ideological objective."
150
    
 Canada's Great Grain Robbery greatly helped the anti-Board side of the CWB debate by 
codifying the ideas of the anti-Board side. The book inaccurately resurrected the "great grain 
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robbery" catch-phrase from the 1970s and repurposed it to now encompass the anti-Board side's  
major themes and issues.  The "great grain robbery" catch-phrase assumed a new prominence 
and immediacy within the agricultural community while providing an easy way for anti-Board 
supporters to refer to many of their issues.  In addition, the book gave the anti-Board side 
historical context in support of its arguments. Prior to the book's publication the anti-Board side 
did not have a unifying historical source unlike the pro-Board side which had a long standing 
practice of using agricultural history to support its arguments. Canada's Great Grain Robbery 
unified many of the ideas of the anti-Board side into a single effective term.   
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Conclusion 
 
 In 1972 Soviet traders used the secrecy of the American grain trading corporations to 
fulfill their need for high volume low cost grains purchases. Their purchasing strategy relied 
heavily on the fact that the American grain trade had no price or demand discovery mechanisms 
because in order to function in this competitive environment the grain trading corporations 
closely guarded all their sales data.  Consequently, the American domestic price and 
international price for grains were held artificially low during the spring and summer of 1972 
because markets did not react to the increased Soviet demand since it was kept secret by the 
companies looking out for their own self-interest and by the American government at the request 
of the Soviets. American farmers lost revenue because they lost ownership of their grain as soon 
as it was delivered to the elevators and the majority of American farmers delivered their grains 
before prices rose in late 1972 to reflect the real demand and supply of tradable grain.  Canadian 
farmers did not suffer the same missed opportunity for profit as their American counterparts 
because they retained beneficial ownership of their grain through the Canadian Wheat Board's 
price pooling and orderly marketing system.  The CWB's intelligence department was able to 
anticipate the Soviet demand which allowed the CWB to negotiate and sell over the full year to 
the Soviets which meant the CWB took advantage of the rising prices to the benefit of Canadian 
farmers. 
 The events of the 1972 American great grain robbery were re-interpreted and inverted by 
a few westerners opposed to the CWB, as evidence of the shortcomings of the Wheat Board and 
its supporting structures, like the Canadian International Grains Institute and Canadian Grain 
Commission, in the Canadian cooperative grain handling system. These re-interpretations and 
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inversions of international events became part of the “received wisdom” of many western 
Canadian farmers which was circulated during debates about farm politics and during general 
discussion within the farm community.  The use of these inverted and distorted interpretations of 
foreign events became part of the further polarization of the farm community in the 1990s and 
the beginning of the second part of the Canadian experience of the great grain robbery.  While 
the historical precedent of the great grain robbery had been referenced from time to time during 
the various debates it was not until the 1990s that the phrase began to hold significance for the 
majority of the farm community.  The anti-Board side recast the Great Grain Robbery as a catch-
phrase to encompass everything that they perceived to be wrong with the Canadian agriculture 
system and especially the Canadian Wheat Board.  The complex problems of technological 
change, like higher yielding seed varieties, increasingly tight economic margins, and rural 
depopulation with their roots in the structure of capitalist economics, coincidentally began with 
the 1935 creation of the CWB by R.B. Bennett and continued with the rising freight rates of the 
1990s after the removal of the Crow rate.  The loss of the Crow Rate combined with the removal 
of the local branch line elevator system created significant financial stress on farmers since they 
were now forced to haul their grain long distances to centralized terminals which was both time 
consuming and very costly compared to the previous branch line elevator system. After the loss 
of the Crow the total number of people claiming to be primarily farmers decreased by 40%.
1
 The 
increasingly tight margins in farming helped to create a climate where the polarization of the 
farm community into pro- and anti- Board factions was embraced because it helped to present a 
serious of complex interconnected issues as a single point: was the Wheat Board good or bad?    
 The 1972 American-Soviet grain sales became only one aspect of this polarization.  The 
1972 sales were rewritten as an example of Canadian farmers being unable to take advantage of 
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US spot prices because of the CWB.  So an institution which had not only successfully sheltered 
western Canada’s farmers from both the consequences of the highly volatile commodity markets 
in general and the negative effects of the Soviet grain purchases in particular, but actually created 
greater profits for them, was successfully cast as a causative villain and convenient scapegoat for 
the structural problems of a grain growing area physically isolated from the global grain market.  
The opponents played on this simple phrase to create the false impression that the CWB had 
denied Canadian farmers the benefits of lucrative sales and was preventing them from making 
higher profits by playing the international market in competition with the major grain trading 
corporations. 
 When Don Baron's book Canada's Great Grain Robbery came out it reinforced all the 
issues that were encompassed by the Great Grain Robbery catch-phrase.  Baron's book was 
highly debated within the farm community and opinion was divided on it.  Anti-Board farmers 
saw the book as a vindication of everything they had been saying, while pro-Board farmers felt it 
was misleading at best and grossly inaccurate at worst.  For both sides, however, it helped to 
codify the points that the anti-Board side of the farm community had been making vigorously 
throughout the 1990s. The anti-Board side of the farm community viewed their re-interpreted 
great grain robbery as historical truth which was being hidden from western Canadian farmers 
whereas the pro-Board group saw it as a piece of historical revisionism which ignored the 
documented historical facts of the Canadian grain trade.  
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The ideas contained within the Great Grain Robbery catch-phrase were referenced in a cartoon 
which was heavily circulated within the farm community during 2000.
2
 The hand-drawn cartoon 
shows a ship heading toward an iceberg labelled "Ice Berg of Truth."  On the iceberg are flags 
labelled "Grain Producers," "W.T.O.," and "U.S.," to show that these individuals and 
organizations are all part of the "Truth" which will sink the ship called "CWB Jolly Rodger 
'Titanic'" as it tries to destroy them.  The "Grain Producers" flag has a sub-flag for "TRJ" which 
is how TRJ, the creator of the cartoon, shows that they are a grain producer and part of the 
"Truth." The "U.S" and "W.T.O." flags make reference to the on-going trade dispute between 
                                                 
2
 Received via fax 
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Canada and the United States over the sales practices of the Canadian Wheat Board which the 
US International Trade Commission (ITC) had investigated several times before the cartoon was 
created. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is used instead of the ITC because the general 
idea in the farm community was that the WTO would agree with the anti-Board farmers' 
assessment of the CWB.  On the deck of the CWB ship is a container labelled "stolen grain" 
which alludes to the catch-phrase of the "great grain robbery" and how anti-Board farmers were 
in a battle to market their own grain. This idea reoccurs in the name "Jolly Rodger" and the skull 
and cross bones flag, known as a Jolly Rodger, on the ship's bow which are references to piracy.  
The cartoonist is reinforcing the idea that the CWB is stealing farmer's grain by equating the 
Wheat Board with piracy.  The dialogue bubble for the figures of the "CWB Directors" on the 
ship, asks "How did you say we should arrange the deck chairs?"  It references the idea 
circulated by the anti-Board side that the CWB is inefficiently run by people who are completely 
out of touch with reality.   
 Ultimately the anti-Board side retired the Great Grain Robbery catch-phrase and it is 
currently out of use within the farm community. As one farmer said, "we don't use [the great 
grain robbery] anymore because it's negative and we want to focus on the positives of getting an 
open market".
3
  But the principle idea contained within the catch-phrase, that the CWB and its 
supporting structures were harming western Canadian farmers and cheating them of money that 
was rightfully theirs, continued to thrive.  The results of CWB director elections
4
 between 1998 
                                                 
3
 Interview with Doug Campbell, 24 February 2010 and 16 March 2010. 
4
 The 1998 revisions of the Canadian Wheat Board Act provided for the Canadian Wheat Board to be run by a board 
of fifteen directors. Five directors were appointed by government and ten were elected by farmers.  The farmers-
elected directors came from the ten CWB districts.  Elections were done by a preferential mail-in ballot. After the 
first election in 1998, the elections were staggered between the odd and even numbered districts so that ten new 
farmers were never elected during each election. This method was done to provide continuity on the CWB board. 
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and 2010
5
 indicated that the farm community continues to be divided between pro- and anti-
Board factions with the majority still voting to retain what they see as a time-tested and proven 
system of collective marketing. 
                                                 
5
 In all the Canadian Wheat Board Directors elections the majority of candidates elected supported the single-desk. 
In 2010 the most recent election 4 out of the 5 seats were won by pro-Board supporters.  CWB District 1 elected an 
anti-Board candidate by a margin of only 31 votes. 786 votes went to Dan Gauthier, the pro-single-desk candidate, 
while 817 votes went to anti-single-desk candidate Henry Vos.  It should also be noted that Ken Ritter, Bill Woods, 
and Rod Flaman were all originally elected on anti-single-desk platforms but after being directions changed to 
supporting the CWB's single-desk.  All three were re-elected when they ran on pro-single-desk platforms. 
Meyers Norris Penny, 2010 Canadian Wheat Board Election of Directors: Detailed Final Results, Winnipeg: 
Meyers Norris Penny, 2010. 
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